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South Africa has historically been ranked as one of the most unequal societies in the world 
and, while the country has experienced sustained positive economic growth since 1994, the 
impact of this growth on poverty, and particularly inequality, has been disappointing. Analysis 
using data from the 1995 and 2000 Income and Expenditure Surveys has found, for example, 
a significant increase in income inequality over the period and, further, that this increase in 
inequality eroded any significant poverty-reduction gains from higher economic growth.  The 
release of the Income and Expenditure Survey 2005 enables us to examine changes in 
inequality over the decade between 1995 and 2005. Some preliminary analysis, however, 
shows a further increase in inequality over the second half of the period. This new result would 
possibly suggest that South Africa is now the most consistently unequal economy in the world. 
Critically, the persistent and increasing levels of inequality have been acting as a constraint 
ensuring that South Africa’s economic growth results in significant declines in household 
poverty levels. 
This study has two main objectives. Firstly, the study aims to identify the drivers of the 
reproduction of inequality in post-apartheid South Africa. The second objective is to examine 
what policy levers are available to help mitigate the impact of increased inequality in South 
Africa. Based on the identification of what is driving the increasing levels of inequality, 
appropriate policy interventions, including assessing the impact and sustainability of existing 
policies such as the increased provision of social grants, will be evaluated 
We find that not only has income inequality remained high for the period under review, but it 
has also increased significantly between 1995 and 2005. Throughout the time period wage 
inequality has been the main contributor to the growing income inequality. For a more holistic 
representation of inequality, we consider the effect of increased public and private assets 
on non-income inequality. We find that there has been a universal decrease in non-income 
inequality in South Africa. We also find that the effect of income inequality has been to dampen 
growth, specifically pro-poor growth. While we found that social transfers have little effect on 
income inequality when we decomposed the various sources of income, when grant income 
is excluded as a source of income from total income we find that it is an extremely important 
supportive source of income and without it many households would experience negative 
income growth. 
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 1.  Introduction 
South Africa has historically been ranked as one of the most unequal societies in the world, 
and while the country has experienced sustained positive economic growth since 1994, the 
impact of this growth on poverty, and particularly inequality, has been disappointing. Analysis 
using data from the 1995 and 2000 Income and Expenditure Surveys has found, for example, 
a significant increase in income inequality over the period and, further, that this increase in 
inequality eroded any significant poverty-reduction gains from higher economic growth.  The 
release of the Income and Expenditure Survey 2005 has enabled us to now examine changes 
in inequality over the 10-year period between 1995 and 2005. Some preliminary analysis, 
however, shows a further increase in inequality over the second half of the period. This new 
result would possibly suggest that South Africa is now the most consistently unequal economy 
in the world. Critically, the persistent and increasing levels of inequality have been acting as 
a constraint to ensuring that South Africa’s economic growth results in significant declines in 
household poverty levels. 
This paper has two main objectives. The first objective is to provide a comprehensive overview 
of the changing levels of inequality in the post-apartheid South Africa and to identify the drivers 
of these changes. This also includes examining the relationship between economic growth, 
poverty and inequality over the period. The second objective is to evaluate the increased 
provision of social grants as a policy option to alleviate the impact of increasing inequality in 
South Africa.
Section 2 provides an overview of the changes in per capita income inequality between 
1995 and 2005. Although private consumption expenditure is generally accepted as a more 
appropriate measure of welfare, we use income to calculate measures of inequality since we 
are particularly interested in the factors (that is, sources of income) that have been driving 
the changes in income inequality. In order to develop a comprehensive overview of welfare 
changes in the country over the period, we also consider the changes in non-income inequality 
as captured by the distribution of access to a range of basic services and privately owned 
assets in Section 3. While it is generally accepted that economic growth has a positive impact 
on poverty, rising income inequality may dampen the impact of economic growth on poverty 
reduction. Section 4 investigates this relationship between economic growth, poverty and 
inequality for the period between 1995 and 2005.
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The final section reviews the impact of Government’s provision of social grants on income 
inequality. While the results from the decomposition of income inequality in Section 2 suggest 
that social grants as source of income did not serve to reduce income inequality, further 
analysis do show that social grant income made a significant contribution to total income 
across the income distribution, particularly in 2005. In this section we therefore exclude grant 
income from total income and recalculate some of the inequality measures as well as the 
growth incidence curves in order to estimate what the levels of inequality would have been in 
the absence of grant income. 
 
Income and Non-Income Inequality in Post-Apartheid South Africa: What are the Drivers and Possible Policy Interventions?
              3 
 2. Shifts in Inequality in Post-Apartheid South Africa
 2.1 Data Sources and the Creation of the Income Variable
Two main sources of data were utilised for this study, namely the 1995 Income and 
Expenditure Survey (1995 IES) and the 2005/06 Income and Expenditure Survey (2005/06 
IES). These household surveys were conducted by Statistics South Africa with the specific aim 
of collecting information on the income and expenditure of South African households. 
The methodologies of data collection as well as the questions themselves differ slightly 
between the two surveys and for the purposes of our analysis we carefully constructed total 
household income aggregates for 1995 and 2005. Only those sources of income that were 
included in both datasets were used to estimate total income.   We were able to match the 
majority of income sources for the two years and only a very small share of income was 
excluded from the final total income aggregates with negligible implication for our inequality 
estimates.   
For both years, total household income was derived as a simple sum of all the comparable 
sources of income. Total household income was then divided by household size to take into 
account the impact of the number of individuals living in a household on the distribution of 
income within that household. The structure (age and gender of the members) of a household 
also impacts on the relative consumption or income levels of the household members, 
with implications for the measurement of poverty and inequality. In order to account for 
this, equivalence scales are utilised, assigning adult equivalent values to the children in a 
household (for example, a child equaling 0.75 or 0.5 adults). At the time of writing, person 
level data (including age and gender) was not yet available for the 2005/06 IES, making it 
impossible to use adult equivalent scales. In addition, Leibbrandt and Woolard (2005) have 
shown that the choice of equivalence scale makes little difference to the ultimate identification 
of vulnerable households. 
While empirical work on the distribution of welfare can be done using expenditure or income 
data, the international norm is to use private consumption expenditure as opposed to income 
when calculating changes in poverty and inequality. With the World Bank defining poverty as 
the “inability to attain a minimal standard of living” – measured in terms of basic consumption 
needs, it follows that consumption expenditure data is more appropriate. In addition, the 
recording of consumption expenditure is usually more reliable and stable than income, 
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especially amongst the poor (see Woolard & Leibbrandt in Leibbrandt et al, 2001 for a detailed 
discussion). The specific aim of our analysis, however, is to identify the sources of income that 
have been driving the changes in inequality between 1995 and 2005 and we therefore proceed 
by first calculating the changes in income inequality over the period.  In order to maintain 
consistency and facilitate the identification of specifically the impact of the provision of social 
grant income on income inequality, all estimates in this paper are calculated using per capita 
income. 
 2.2 Changes in Per Capita Income, 1995 - 2005
Table 1 provides an overview of the changes in individual per capita income between 1995 and 
2005. All individuals, irrespective of race and the gender of the household head, experienced 
statistically significant increases in their nominal per capita household incomes between 1995 
and 2005. At the aggregate level, nominal incomes more than doubled over the decade, with 
slightly lower growth experienced by African and Asian individuals.
Table 1:  Changes in Per Capita Income by Race and Gender of Household Head, 1995 - 2005
 Nominal Real % Change
 1995 2005 1995 2005 Nominal Real
African 5,144.68 9,156.97 7,105.91 6,979.40 77.99% -1.78%*
Coloured 7,075.80 17,335.16 9,773.20 13,212.78 144.99% 35.19%
Asian 16,688.50 32,415.41 23,050.42 24,706.87 94.24% 7.19%*
White 35,907.41 91,420.28 49,595.87 69,680.09 154.60% 40.50%
Male Headed 10,866.91 24,433.57 15,009.54 18,623.15 124.84% 24.08%
Female Headed 4,774.59 9,797.55 6,594.74 7,467.64 105.20% 13.24%*
Total 8,940.51 18,066.27 12,348.77 13,770.02 102.07% 11.51%
Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 & 2005) and Own Calculations
Notes: 1. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the population in 2005    
  has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the population has been weighted    
  by the household weight multiplied by the household size.
	 2.	 And	asterisk	(*)	denotes	that	the	change	is	not	statistically	significant	at	the	95	percent	level.
DPRU WP 09/138                        Haroon Bhorat, Carlene van der Westhuizen & Toughedah Jacobs
               5 
When the impact of inflation over the period is taken into account, the increase in real income 
at the aggregate level was only about 11.5 percent. White individuals, followed by Coloured 
individuals, experienced the largest increases in their real income, with increases of 40.5 
and 35.2 percent respectively. Individuals living in male headed households experienced an 
increase of about 24 percent in their real incomes over the decade. However, in real terms, 
Africans, Asians and individuals living in households headed by females, did not experience 
any statistically significant change in their incomes over the period. 
While the evidence presented above suggests that, at least in nominal terms, all South 
Africans experienced growth in their incomes between 1995 and 2005, the following section 
considers the changes in the distribution of income that accompanied that growth in per capita 
income. 
 2.3 Shifts in Income Inequality Between 1995 and 2005
The South African society has historically been characterised by high levels of income 
inequality and in the following section we provide an overview of the changes in income 
inequality between 1995 and 2005. Three standard measures are utilised, namely the Gini 
coefficient, the Lorenz Curve and the Theil index. These measures are complementary to each 
other as they are able to describe the extent and nature of inequality in different ways.
2.3.1	 The	Gini	Coefficient
The Gini coefficient is one of the most commonly used measures of inequality since it is 
relatively easy to understand and interpret. The crucial drawback of the Gini coefficient is that 
it is not additively decomposable. This means that while it is easy to interpret, the overall Gini 
coefficient is not a sum or average of the respective subgroup Gini coefficients. Simply put, it 
is not possible to combine the various provincial Gini coefficients, for example, to obtain the 
national Gini coefficient. In fact, it is quite possible that the national Gini coefficient can be 
greater than or less than all nine provincial coefficients. 
The Gini coefficient is derived from the Lorenz Curve, which is a graphical depiction 
of income distribution. Figure 1 presents an example of a Lorenz Curve, indicated by the 
solid curved line, which is constructed with the cumulative percentage of the population, 
arranged from poorest to the richest, on the horizontal axis, and the cumulative percentage 
of income received by each cumulative percentage of population on the vertical axis. 
The Lorenz Curve is then a graphical representation of the relationship between the 
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cumulative percentage of income and the cumulative percentage of (ordered) population. 
Thus, in practice, one would be able to say the poorest 20 percent of the population earn, 
for example, five percent of total income, while the poorest 40 percent of the population 
earn, say, 15 percent of the income. The Lorenz Curve will start at the origin, the 
point where zero percent of the population receives zero percent of the income, and will 
end at the point where 100 percent of the population enjoys 100 percent of the income.
The more unequal a society, the smaller the proportion of income that will accrue to the 
poorest segment of the population and, accordingly, the lower the Lorenz Curve will be on 
the figure. At its most extreme – perfect inequality – one person receives all the income and 
all other individuals receive nothing and the Lorenz Curve will therefore proceed horizontally 
from the origin, remaining on the horizontal axis until the last person is added to the cumulative 
shares, which will result in the Curve going up almost vertically to the point where 100 percent 
of the population receives 100 percent of the income (forming, in other words, a reversed ‘L’ 
shape). Conversely, a situation of perfect equality will see each person receiving the same 
income and, thus, the poorest 20 percent of the population will receive 20 percent of the 
income, the poorest 40 percent of the population will receive 40 percent of the income and so 
on. In this case, the Lorenz Curve will form a straight diagonal line from the origin to the point 
where 100 percent of the population receives 100 percent of the income (illustrated by the 
broken line in the figure). This line is known as the line of perfect equality. Any Lorenz Curve 
(except for perfect equality) will therefore lie below the diagonal. 
Figure 1: An Example Lorenz Curve
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 The Gini coefficient is a measure of the extent of the deviation of the observed Lorenz Curve 
from the line of perfect equality and is calculated by relating the area between the Lorenz 
Curve and the line of perfect equality (graphically represented by area A) to the total area 
below the line of perfect equality (graphically represented by the sum of area A and area B), 
expressed as a proportion. 
Simply put, the Gini coefficient equals A/(A+B), with possible values ranging from zero to one 
(Sen 1997; Fields 2001). A value of zero implies that area A equals zero, i.e. that the Lorenz 
Curve lies exactly on the line of perfect equality, and thus a Gini coefficient of zero indicates 
perfect equality within a society. A value of one implies that area B equals zero, i.e. that the 
Lorenz Curve follows the horizontal axis and then turns almost vertical (forming a reversed 
‘L’ shape), representing a situation of perfect inequality. The higher the Gini coefficient is, 
therefore, the higher the level of inequality. 
2.3.2  The Theil Index
In contrast to the Gini coefficient, the Theil index is neither intuitive nor easy to interpret. 
However, its one advantage is that it has the ability to decompose overall inequality into a 
proportion originating between subgroups and a proportion originating within subgroups. Thus, 
for example, overall inequality can be decomposed by race, with a certain proportion of overall 
inequality being explained by inequality between the race groups, and the remainder being 
explained by within race groups.
The Theil-T statistic is defined as T = TB + ∑qiTi ,  where Ti measures the inequality within 
the ith group, qi is the proportion of income accruing to the ith group, and TB measures the 
inequality between the different subgroups. Even though TB and T are calculated similarly, TB 
assumes that all the incomes within a group are equal (Leibbrandt et al 2001). 
2.3.3 Results for South Africa: 1995-2005
The section below presents the changes in income inequality, using per capita household 
income, for South Africa between 1995 and 2005. The results suggest that all South Africans, 
irrespective of race, location, or the gender of the household head, experienced an increase in 
income inequality over the decade. 
For the South African economy as a whole, the Gini coefficient increased from 0.64 in 1995 to 
0.72 in 2005.  This result is disturbing for at least two reasons. Firstly, international experience 
has shown that measures of income inequality do not alter significantly over time in either 
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direction. It takes large shifts in economic growth for example, to change an economy’s 
income distribution or a very particular pattern of growth (Kanbur 2005). Secondly, the result is 
disconcerting within the context of South Africa being historically ranked as the most unequal 
society in the world with Brazil. This new result suggests that South Africa is now the most 








Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
Notes:	 1.		 The	changes	in	the	values	of	the	Gini	coefficients	between	1995	and	2005	are	“in	bold”	when	the	results	are		 	
	 	 statistically		 significant	at	the	95	percent	level.
 2. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the population in 2005 has been   
  weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the population has been weighted by the household   
  weight multiplied by the household size.
The data by race confirms that, with the exception of Asian individuals, all population groups 
experienced a statistically significant increase in income inequality over the period as 
measured by the Gini coefficients. While the Coloured population experienced the largest 
relative increase in inequality, with their Gini coefficient increasing from 0.49 in 1995 to 0.59 in 
2005, the African population displayed the highest level of inequality in both years. In 1995, the 
relatively higher levels of inequality experienced by Africans are statistically significant, but due 
to the large increase in Coloured inequality, the Gini coefficients for these two groups are not 
statistically significantly different from each other in 2005. In other words, by 2005 these two 
groups experienced relatively similar levels of inequality, with the White population continuing 
to experience relatively lower levels of inequality. 
The Lorenz Curve presented in Figure 2 visually confirms the changes in inequality 
experienced by South Africa between 1995 and 2005. The Lorenz Curve also confirms the 
robustness of the changes in inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. 
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Figure 2:  Lorenz Curve for South Africa, 1995 and 2005
 
Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
Notes:	 1.	 The	changes	in	the	values	of	the	Gini	coefficients	between	1995	and	2005	are	statistically	significant	at	the	
	 	 95	percent	level.	
 2. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the population in 2005    
  has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the population has been weighted    
  by the household weight multiplied by the household size.
In 1995, for example, the Lorenz Curve shows that the “poorest” 80 percent of the population 
only received about 30 percent of the income. By 2005, the share of income received by the 
same cumulative share of the population declined to just more than 20 percent. Put differently, 
by 2005, the “richest” 20 percent of South Africans received almost 80 percent of income while 
in 1995, this segment of the population received about 70 percent of income.
Figure 3 presents the Lorenz Curves for Africans and Whites for 1995 and 2005. Again, 
these visually confirm the increasing levels of inequality experienced by both population 
groups between 1995 and 2005. For both White and African individuals, the 2005 curves are 
positioned further away from the “equality” curve than the 1995 curves. 
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White 1995 equality
Race
Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
Notes:	 1.	 The	changes	in	the	values	of	the	Gini	coefficients	between	1995	and	2005	are	statistically	significant	at	the	
	 	 95	percent	level.	
 2. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the population in 2005    
  has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the population has been weighted    
  by the household weight multiplied by the household size.
The Lorenz Curves also confirm that in both years, Africans experienced relatively higher 
levels of inequality than the White population. For example, the position of the Lorenz Curves 
indicates that in 2005, the “bottom” 80 percent of the White population received approximately 
45 percent of the income in this population group. In 2005, the “poorest” 80 percent of the 
African population only received about 30 percent of the total income accumulated by this 
population group.
Table 3 presents the Theil index by race for 1995 and 2005. Historically, as a result of the 
policies implemented during apartheid, the high levels of inequality in the country have been 
driven by inequality between race groups (See Leibbrandt et al 2001).More recent studies, 
either using data from the 1996 and 2001 Census or the 1995 and 2000 IES, have found an 
increase in the contribution of within-group inequality to total inequality, driven to a large extent 
by the increase in inequality amongst Africans. The rising inequality amongst Africans has 
been driven by high African unemployment on the one hand and increasing incomes at the 
very top of the distribution on the other (see Leibbrandt et al 2005 and Hoogeveen & Özler 
2006). 
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The Theil index presented here, however, suggest a reversal of the trends observed by the 
studies cited above. Specifically, the results in Table 3 suggest that the contribution of within-
group inequality has declined in the decade between 1995 and 2005, while the between-group 
inequality component has gained in importance. 
Table 3: Theil Index by Race for South Africa, 1995-2005 
By Race 1995 2005
Total Inequality (Theil-T) 0.87  100% 1.14 100% 
Within 0.50 57.4% 0.63 55.6%
Between 0.37 42.6% 0.51 44.4%
Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
Notes:	 We	are	unable	to	calculate	t-statistics	and	confidence	intervals	for	the	Theil	Index	and	therefore	unable	to	comment	on	the		 	
	 statistical	significance	of	the	changes	between	1995	and	2005	in	the	Theil	Index.	
This result presented in Table 3 is critical, since it suggests that it is primarily income 
differences between race groups, rather than those within, that have been driving South 
Africa’s growing inequality levels. Put differently, this suggests that the contrasting income 
gains made across race groups has been the key determinant of rising aggregate income 
inequality in the South African economy. In addition, this suggests that the past view that the 
rise in income inequality has been mostly caused by the growing African affluence relative to 
the increasing unemployment within the African population has to be reconsidered. 
In addition to race and location, gender is also considered a key marker of vulnerability in the 
South African context. Table 4 presents the changes in income inequality according to the 
gender of the head of the household. Again, all South Africans, irrespective of the gender of 




Male head of Household 0.63 0.70
Female head of Household 0.59 0.68
Overall 0.64 0.72
Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
Notes:	 1.	 	The	changes	in	the	values	of	the	Gini	coefficients	between	1995	and	2005	are	“in	bold”	when	the	results	are		 	
	 	 statistically		 significant	at	the	95	percent	level.
 2. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the population in 2005    
  has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the population has been weighted    
  by the household weight multiplied by the household size. 
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The Gini coefficient for individuals living in households headed by males increased from 0.63 
to 0.70, while the Gini coefficient for those living in female-headed households increased from 
0.59 in 1995 to 0.68 in 2005. In both years, however, the difference in the Gini coefficients 
according to the gender of the household is not statistically significant. In other words, 
the gender of the household head did not impact significantly on the levels of inequality 
experienced by the household members.
The Lorenz Curve according to the gender of the household head visually confirms the results 
presented in Table 4. 
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 Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
Notes:	 1.	 The	changes	in	the	values	of	the	Gini	coefficients	between	1995	and	2005	are	statistically	significant	at	the	95		 	
	 	 percent	level	with	the	exception	of	the	Rural	population.	
 2. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the population in 2005 has been   
  weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the population has been weighted by the household   
  weight multiplied by the household size.
The Lorenz Curves in Figure 4 clearly show that both male- and female-headed households 
experienced increases in their levels of income inequality, with both 2005 curves lying further 
away from the “line of equality” than the 1995 curves. In both years, however, the curves for 
the two cohorts lie relatively close to each other and even cross each other, illustrating that 
there were very little difference in the levels of inequality experienced by these two groups. 
The Theil Index, presented in Appendix 4, confirms this result. In both years, more than ninety 
percent of total inequality was driven by inequality within these two groups, with the decline in 
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the contribution of this component almost negligible. In other words, inequality between male 
and female headed households contributed very little to total inequality in both years. 
Table 5 presents the Gini coefficients by location, specifically by urban and rural area. 
Individuals living in urban areas experienced a statistically significant increase in income 
inequality, with their Gini coefficient increasing from 0.59 to 0.69 between 1995 and 2005. The 
rural population did not experience any statistically significant change in income inequality over 
the same period, with their Gini coefficient remaining relatively stable (0.62 in 1995 and 0.60 in 
2005). The difference between the Gini coefficients for the rural and urban population groups 
is only statistically significant in 2005, driven by the increase in urban inequality. This means 
that by 2005, individuals living in urban areas were experiencing significantly higher levels of 
inequality than their rural counterparts. 
Table	5:	Gini	Coefficient	by	Location,	1995-2005




Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
Notes:								 1.	 The	changes	in	the	values	of	the	Gini	coefficients	between	1995	and	2005	are	“in	bold”	when	the	results	are		 	
	 	 statistically		 significant	at	the	95	percent	level.
 2. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the population in 2005    
  has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the population has been weighted    
  by the household weight multiplied by the household size.
The rise in income inequality for urban areas is another crucial result, and it appears as if 
income inequality in urban areas has become another significant shaper of aggregate income 
inequality. A major contributing factor to the increase in income inequality in urban areas is 
migration, in the form of both rural-urban migration and cross-border (that is, across provincial 
borders) migration, or more simply put, from weak economies to relatively stronger economies. 
Limited employment and income generating opportunities force migrants to migrate from rural 
areas to urban areas or from poorer to relatively better-off provinces. Most migrants have little 
formal skills and once in urban areas, are restricted to low paying jobs or are compelled to 
work in the insecure informal sector (Posel & Casale 2006). Growing inequality, especially in 
the better performing (and mostly urban) provinces such as Gauteng and the Western Cape, 
could thus also be caused by the stretching of the wage income distribution. 
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 Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
Notes:	 1.	 The	changes	in	the	values	of	the	Gini	coefficients	between	1995	and	2005	are	statistically	significant	at	the	95		 	
	 	 percent	level	with	the	exception	of	the	Rural	population.	
 2. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the     
  population in 2005 has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the population has   
  been weighted by the household weight multiplied by the household size.
The Lorenz Curves in Figure 5 very clearly show that income inequality increased significantly 
in urban areas between 1995 and 2005. The positions of the rural Lorenz curves confirm that 
inequality in rural areas remained relatively unchanged. In addition, the curves clearly illustrate 
that while the levels of urban inequality in 1995 appear to be lower than the levels of rural 
inequality in both years, for the most part the 2005 urban Lorenz Curve lies outside both the 
rural curves, confirming the relatively higher levels of urban inequality in 2005.
The Theil index by location reveals that income inequality is driven predominantly by the 
income inequality within the urban and rural population, and not between individuals living 
in urban and rural areas respectively. There was only a slight increase in the contribution 
of between group inequality between 1995 and 2005, driven by the slightly higher levels of 
inequality in urban areas relative to rural areas. 
DPRU WP 09/138                        Haroon Bhorat, Carlene van der Westhuizen & Toughedah Jacobs
               15 
Table 6: Theil Index by Location for South Africa, 1995-2005
By Location
 1995 2005
All (total) 0.87  1.14  
Within 0.75 86.7% 0.98 85.8%
Between 0.11 13.3% 0.16 16.6%
Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
Notes:	 We	are	unable	to	calculate	t-statistics	and	confidence	intervals	for	the	Theil	Index	and	therefore	unable	to	comment	on	the		 	
	 statistical	significance	of	the	changes	between	1995	and	2005	in	the	Theil	Index.	
The changes in income inequality for the nine provinces in South Africa as measured by the 
Gini coefficient can be found in Appendix 2. Six of the nine provinces experienced statistically 
significant increases in income inequality between 1995 and 2005. The Western Cape, the 
Eastern Cape, the Northern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and Mpumalanga experienced 
increases in their Gini coefficients of between four and twelve percentage points. (The Free 
State, North West and Limpopo provinces did not experience any statistically significant 
change in their levels of inequality.)  The Theil index by province (see Appendix 3) shows 
that inequality within the provinces has been the key driver of total inequality over the period, 
with the contribution of within-group inequality remaining relatively unchanged at around 90 
percent. 
 2.4 Decomposing Income Inequality in South Africa
The data presented in the section above provides a general overview of the changes in 
income inequality in South Africa. While the estimates for income inequality are, as noted 
above, startlingly high, we attempt below a standard decomposition of the Gini coefficient by 
income sources, using the methodology developed by  Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985). In terms of 
the focus here, we are particularly interested in how the different income sources manifest as 
drivers of income inequality in South Africa. We also decompose the Gini coefficient by income 
sources for the four race groups, and the results can be found in Appendix 7. 
The sources of income that are utilised in the disaggregation of the Gini coefficient are wage 
income, income derived from self employment, state transfers (or state grants), capital income 
and private pensions. All other income sources are combined into the ‘other’ category.  From 
a policy perspective, the roles of state transfers and income from self-employment are of a 
particular interest to us, since we expect that these two sources of income have the most 
potential to decrease the high levels of inequality. 
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where Sk represents the importance (percent share) of the income source k in total income, Gk 
is the Gini coefficient of the distribution of income source k for all individuals, and Rk is the Gini 
correlation of income from source k with total income. The three components, Sk, Gk and Rk, 
enter multiplicatively into the equation and the product SkGkRk is the contribution of the income 
source k to the Gini coefficient calculated using total income. The size of the contribution of a 
given income source k to total income inequality therefore depends on the value of the product 
SkGkRk. The only component that can possibly have a negative value is Rk (ranging between 
negative and positive one), indicating a possible negative correlation between the income from 
source k and total income. Such an income source would then contribute towards lowering 
overall income inequality for the group. 
Decomposing the Gini coefficient using this method means that we are looking at the 
relationship between Rk, Sk and Gk, and considering the cumulative effect of these three 
variables on the Gini coefficient for the various income sources. For example, we see below 
that capital income and income from private pensions contribute very little to overall inequality 
even though both sources of income have a high positive correlation with total income. These 
two income sources also display high levels of inequality, but since these two sources of 
income constitute only a small share of total income, their overall contributions to income 
inequality are negligible. Wage income on the other hand is the main contributor to the high 
income inequality found within South Africa since wages are (1) highly correlated with the 
Gini coefficient; (2) wage inequality is high as yielded by the high Gini coefficient; and (3) its 
share of total income is significant. It is therefore expected that it would be one of the main 
contributors to and the drivers of total income inequality. 
Table 7 presents the results for the Gini decomposition by income sources for South Africa for 
1995 and 2005. Wage income is the most dominant source of income at the aggregate level as 
well as for all race groups in both years. In 1995 wage income constituted 60 percent of total 
income and by 2005, this share has increased to 70 percent of total income. 
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Income Source (1995) Rk Gk Sk SkGkRk Share
Wage income 0.90 0.72 0.61 0.39 60.9%
Self-employment 0.89 0.98 0.15 0.13 19.7%
Grants -0.08 0.84 0.04 0.00 -0.4%
Capital 0.85 0.99 0.01 0.01 1.5%
Private	pensions 0.73 0.98 0.03 0.02 3.7%
Other 0.69 0.81 0.17 0.09 14.6%
Gini    0.64 100.0%
Income Source (2005)
Wage income 0.95 0.81 0.70 0.54 75.6%
Self-employment 0.83 0.97 0.11 0.09 11.9%
Grants 0.00 0.69 0.07 0.00 0.0%
Capital 0.88 1.00 0.01 0.01 1.5%
Private	pensions 0.76 0.98 0.03 0.02 3.0%
Other 0.73 0.89 0.09 0.06 7.9%
Gini    0.72 100.0%
Sources: Statistics South Africa 1995, 2005 and Own Calculations
Notes:  1. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the population in 2005 has been   
  weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the population has been weighted by the household   
  weight multiplied by the household size.
Since wage income contributes significantly to total income, it is expected that it would also be 
the income source, which contributes most significantly to income inequality and the results 
presented above confirm this. Wage income has increased its contribution to income inequality 
by 14.7 percentage points over the period, from 61 percent in 1995 to almost 76 percent in 
2006.
Figure 6 provides further evidence of the significant contribution of wage income to income 
inequality. This graph shows the contribution of the four main sources of income to total 
income in each income decile for 1995 and 2005. It is evident that the share of wage income 
in total income is relatively higher for those in the top four deciles, while this proportion 
decreases considerably in the bottom income deciles. This result highlights the role the labour 
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market plays as a driver of income inequality. On the one hand, highly skilled workers are 
rewarded with high wages, while lower and unskilled workers are either poorly paid or unable 
to find employment – thus accounting for the relatively small contribution of wage income to 
total income in the bottom income deciles. 
Figure 6: Changes in contribution of the different sources of income, 1995 - 2005
Source:  Statistics South Africa (1995 & 2005) and Own Calculations
Notes: 1. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the population in 2005    
  has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the population has been weighted    
  by the household weight multiplied by the household size.
	 2.	 See	Appendix	1	for	an	illustration	of	mean	per	capita	income	by	income	decile.	
The results for grant income in the Gini decomposition are unexpected. Given the 
methodology used to decompose the Gini coefficient, the expectation was that the Gini 
correlation of grant income with total income would be negative, that is, that only those at the 
very bottom of the income distribution (with no income from other sources) would receive grant 
income. This would mean that social grants would be a source of income that would decrease 
income inequality. We see that in 1995, grant income did serve to decrease total income 
inequality, but with a magnitude of less than half a percent. In 2005, however, grant income 
did not serve to either increase or decrease income inequality. In fact, its contribution to total 
inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient was zero. 
The explanation for this result lies in the relationship between grant income and total income. 
The general assumption is that grants are only targeted at households at the bottom of the 
income distribution (that is, the poorest of the poor), and the result would be a negative or 
inverse relationship between grant income and total income. Figure 6, however, shows that 
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in 2005, households in the middle-income deciles also received grant income and that this 
income source made a significant contribution to total income in these income deciles. (In 
fact, grant income accounted for almost 20 percent of the total income of households in the 
seventh income decile and even households in the top three deciles received some grant 
income. As a result, the relationship between grant income and total income is positive. The 
Gini decomposition therefore captures the fact that social grants are provided to households 
across most of the income distribution and the provision of grant income thus appears to be 
distribution neutral.
While the result above may suggest that the provision of social grants has not been as well-
targeted as previously thought, it is important to remember that even in the seventh income 
decile, mean per capita incomes can be relatively low. In fact, in 2005, the annual mean per 
capita income in the seventh income decile was only around R8 800 and in the same year, the 
value of the Old Age Pension was R780 a month (National Treasury, 2005) or R9 360 a year – 
which is more than the mean income in the seventh income decile.
Income from self-employment is the second highest contributing source of income to income 
inequality. The contribution of this income source to total inequality has, however, decreased 
considerably, from 19.7 percent in 1995 to 11.9 percent in 2005. This trend can partly be 
explained by the fact that in 1995 only individuals in the tenth income decile earned a 
substantial share of income from self-employment (more than 20 percent). By 2005, the 
relative contribution of income from self-employment to total income has declined by almost 50 
percent in the tenth decile, while all other deciles experienced an increase in the share of total 
income attributed to self-employment. In fact, it appears as if the average contribution of this 
income source was between five and ten percent in the bottom seven deciles, with a slightly 
larger share in the top three deciles. This relatively larger share in the top deciles accounted 
for the positive contribution of this source to total income inequality. 
While entering into self-employment is often proposed as an opportunity for the unemployed to 
gain employment and earn income, it is difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions from the 
result presented above. Income from self-employment (including informal sector employment) 
was captured differently in the two surveys  and the increased income from self-employment 
in the lower deciles may to a large extent reflect the improved capturing of income from these 
activities. It is therefore difficult to accurately deduce from the above that increased levels of 
self-employment accounted for the decline in the contribution of this income source to total 
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income inequality. Finally, it is also clear that income from self employment did not serve to 
actually reduce income inequality in 2005. 
The Gini coefficient was also decomposed by income sources for the four race groups. The 
results can be found as Appendix 7.  
Even though all race groups experienced an increase in the contribution of wage income to 
total income, the composition of total income differs slightly by race. Wage income contributed 
64 percent to total income for the African population in 1995 and 68 percent in 2005. The 
contribution of wage income to total income increased more significantly for White individuals 
relative to the other race groups, from 55 percent in 1995 to 70 percent in 2005. 
The results for the races, especially for the African population, are very similar to the 
aggregate results. Again, we find that wage income is the driver of income inequality for all 
race groups, and its contribution to income inequality has increased between 1995 and 2005. 
It plays a particularly important role in explaining the income inequality for the African and 
Coloured population group, with wage income contributing more than 80 percent to income 
inequality. While the sources of income that drive inequality are the same, their importance 
in explaining income inequality differs across the race groups. Grant income is distributional 
neutral for the African and White population, while it has a slight dampening effect on income 
inequality within Coloured population. In other words, the provision of social grants did manage 
to reduce income inequality very slightly for Coloured individuals in both years. 
Wage Income as a Driver of Income Inequality
The above analysis of income inequality has made it clear that wage income is the leading 
contributing factor to income inequality. In addition, its contribution to income inequality has 
increased between 1995 and 2005. Hence it is unmistakable that wages remain the factor 
explaining income inequality, but its importance in explaining income inequality has been 
further entrenched over the years. If we can understand what factors are driving wage income, 
and which portion of the distribution of households have access to wage income, then it may 
then be possible to improve our understanding of income inequality. 
Figure 7 shows the percentage of the population in South Africa that had access to wage 
income and how this was distributed across the total per capita income deciles in 1995 and 
2005. The share of individuals with access to wage income increased over the period in the 
bottom two deciles and in the top four deciles. In the third to the sixth deciles, the proportion of 
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individuals with access to wage income was slightly lower in 2005 than in 1995. Regardless of 
these changes, in both years relatively larger proportions of the population had access to wage 
income as you move along the income distribution. 
The increase in individuals with access to wage income in the top income deciles alludes to 
the distorted character of the post-apartheid South African labour market. The labour market 
is typically characterised by a mismatch in the demand and supply of labour, with a continuing 
increase in the demand for skilled labour, while there is a vast pool of unskilled labour 
available. Since 1995, there has also been a general increase in labour force participation 
rates, but insufficient employment opportunities have been created for these new labour 
market entrants (Bhorat & Goga 2008) and (Bhorat & Oosthuizen 2006). The result was 
increasing levels of unemployment over the period.
The structural change in the South African economy, that is, a shift away from the primary and 
secondary sectors to the tertiary sector has driven the increased demand for skilled labour. As 
a result, the relative wages of skilled workers have increased over 1995 to 2005 period. Skilled 
workers (such as Managers and Professionals) are concentrated in households at the top end 
of the income distribution, with these workers generally more employable in the current South 
African labour market and more able to command relatively higher wages. A relatively small 
portion of the South African population is skilled, and it is this skill premium which causes the 
skewed wage distribution, ultimately driving the high levels of income inequality in South Africa. 
Figure 7: Percentage of Population with Access to Wage Income, 1995 - 2005
Sources: Statistics South Africa 1995 and 2008; Own Calculations
Notes:		 Population	weights	are	not	available	for	the	2005	dataset.	The	population	has	been	weighted	by	the	household	weight			 	
 multiplied by the household size to obtain the population weights. Both sets of weights are 2001 Census weights. 
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Since wage inequality is the most important contributing factor to income inequality, a more 
detailed analysis into wage inequality is warranted. Given the limitations of the IES, a more 
detailed analysis of wage distribution using these datasets is not possible.  We draw on 
existing evidence from studies using other datasets to explain the inequality found within 
wages. Bhorat and Goga (2008) investigate wage inequality using the 2001 and 2006 Labour 
Force Survey of South Africa. Wage inequality is first measured by estimating the Gini 
coefficient for real wages and secondly by analysing the differences in the distribution of real 
wages. While they find that the Gini coefficient has remained relatively stable between 2001 
and 2006, their analysis of changes in the wage differential shows that there has been a 
decrease in the overall wage inequality. 
Bhorat and Goga (2008) analyse the changes in the 90-10, 90-50 and 50-10 wage differentials 
between 2001 and 2006. The 90-10 differential represents the differences in wages for 
those at the 90th and 10th percentile of the wage distribution, the 90-50 differential explains 
the differential in wages for those at the 90th and 50th percentile and the 50-10 differential 
explains the differential in wages between the 50th and 10th percentile. The 90-10 wage 
differential is thus a proxy for ‘overall wage inequality’, and it is also the sum of the difference 
in inequality in the top and bottom-half of the distribution. Ultimately they find that overall 
wage inequality has decreased over the period, but the 50-10 and 90-50 differentials display 
opposing trends. They show that while the 90-10 and 50-10 wage differential decreased, it 
was the increasing 90-50 wage differential that contributed the most to wage inequality. The 
decrease in inequality at the lower end of the distribution, that is, the 50-10 wage differential, 
could be explained by the introduction of minimum wage legislation. The increasing 90-50 
wage differential is explained by two forces, the first is the rising premium paid to highly skilled 
workers accompanied by the stagnating wages for skilled workers. 
Wage inequality in the latter part of post-apartheid South Africa is therefore explained by 
increasing wages for skilled workers and particularly the gap between the wages of those at 
the top  (90th percentile) and middle (50th percentile) of the distribution. 
 2.5 Changes in Non-income Inequality
The evidence presented in the previous section has shown that South Africa’s levels of income 
inequality have increased between 1995 and 2005. With a few minor exceptions, this trend 
was observed to be invariant with respect to race, location and the gender of the household 
head. We also found that the increase in income inequality was driven by increasing levels of 
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wage inequality. Importantly, however, it would be imprudent to ignore other indicators of living 
standards, such as access to basic services and private assets. Access to basic services is 
an important measure of living standards as it has a direct impact on the quality of life of the 
population (Leibbrandt et al 2006).
To measure changes in non-income inequality we construct an index of basic services 
consisting of public and private assets. The public assets included in the index are: the 
type of dwelling (formal, informal, or traditional); type of roof (brick, tile, corrugated, thatch, 
asbestos or other); type of wall material (low or high quality), source of water (piped, public, 
surface or borehole), source of energy for lighting (electricity, paraffin, or candle) and type of 
toilet (flush/chemical, pit, pit-VIP, bucket or none). The private assets included in the index 
are: telecommunications (cellular telephones and landline), vehicle, radio and television. 
The 1995 and 2005 IES datasets used in our estimation of income inequality do not contain 
sufficient information on access to public and private assets. We therefore chose to utilise the 
1993 South African Integrated Household Survey from the Project for Living Standards and 
Development (PSLSD) and the 2005 General Households Survey (GHS) in our estimations of 
changes in non-income inequality. Both these surveys are nationally representative household 
surveys and we present the changes in non-income welfare by households and not individuals. 
Aggregate non-income inequality has decreased significantly between 1993 and 2005 and this 
decline in non-income inequality stands in direct contrast to the substantial increase in income 
inequality between 1995 and 2005. The improvement in the levels of non-income inequality is 
largely the result of the increased access to public services (see Bhorat et al 2007) for a more 











The African population also experienced a significant decrease in non-income inequality. 
Importantly, non-income inequality for the African population remains higher than non-
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income inequality at the aggregate level and for the other race groups. (The changes in non-
income inequality for the other race groups are not statistically significant.)  While the African 
population has benefitted significantly from the increase in the provision of basic services 
since 1994, a large share of the African population remains without access to water, electricity, 
housing and sanitation. Addressing these major backlogs in the delivery of basic services will 
serve to further reduce non-income inequality in the country.
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The Lorenz Curve in Figure 8 visually confirms that aggregate non-income inequality has 
decreased substantially between 1993 and 2005. For example, in 1993, 60 percent of the 
population had access to or owned 40 percent of the total assets and services in the economy, 
and by 2005, this increased to approximately 50 percent. 
The results of the Theil index calculated using per capita income, showed an increase in 
between group inequality when race is considered. In contrast, when the Theil index is 
calculated using our basic services index, the results suggest that non-income inequality has 
increased within race groups. 
Table 9: Theil Index for Non-income Inequality by Race for South Africa, 1993-2005
By Race 1993 Share 2005 Share
Within 0.06262 60.1% 0.05139 79.2%
Between 0.04155 39.9% 0.01347 20.8%
Overall 0.10417 0.06486
Source:	PSLSD	1993	(SALDRU),	GHS	2005	(Statistics	South	Africa);	Own	Calculations
DPRU WP 09/138                        Haroon Bhorat, Carlene van der Westhuizen & Toughedah Jacobs
               25 
In other words, it is the differences in access to basic services and private assets within 
race groups that drive non-income inequality. As highlighted above, the post-apartheid 
government has made significant progress in the delivery of basic services to households. 
In addition, government’s delivery of public assets between 1993 and 2005 has generally 
been pro-poor, both in the absolute and relative sense. Households in the bottom expenditure 
deciles experienced greater increases in access to public assets than those at the top of the 
distribution (Leibbrandt et al 2006 and Bhorat et al 2007). However, while households at the 
top of the distribution generally have access to all services and assets, those at the bottom 
are still lagging behind. The Theil index in particular captures the fact that within the African 
population group, a large number of households still do not have access to basic services. 
Table 10 shows that, in line with the aggregate result, non-income inequality decreased 
significantly for both male- and female-headed households. 
Table	10:	Gini	Coefficient	by	Gender	of	Household	Head	for	Non-income	Inequality	by	Race	for	South	
Africa, 1993-2005







While female-headed households experienced the largest relative decrease in non-income 
inequality between 1993 and 2005, non-income inequality remained relatively higher for 
female-headed households than at the aggregate and for male-headed households in 2005. 
This result again captures the relatively higher levels of vulnerability experienced by females 
and households headed by females in South Africa. 
The Lorenz Curves confirm the decline in non-income inequality for both male- and female-
headed households. Both the 2005 curves are lying closer to the “equality” line than the 1993 
curves. In addition, the difference in non-income inequality between male and female-headed 
households has decreased significantly between 1993 and 2005 as a result of the relatively 
larger decline in non-income inequality experienced by female-headed households. In 1993, 
for example, 60 percent of female-headed households had access to less than 40 percent of 
assets and services, while in 2005, these households had access to approximately 45 percent 
of assets and services. The decline in non-income inequality for male-headed households was 
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slightly smaller. In 1993, 60 percent of female-headed households had access to about  45 
percent of assets and services, while in 2005, 60 percent of male-headed households had 
access to less than 50 percent of assets and services. 
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The results from the Theil index according to the gender of the household head confirm that 
the difference in non-income inequality between male and female headed households is 
relatively small and that it has in fact decreased over the period. In 2005, more than 98 percent 
of total inequality was driven by the inequality within these two cohorts. 
Table 11: Theil Index by Gender of Household Head for Non-income Inequality by Race for South Africa, 
1993-2005
By Gender of Household Head 1993 2005
Within 0.09443 96.2% 0.0637 98.2%
Between 0.00378 3.8% 0.00118 1.8%
Over all 0.09821 0.06488
Source:	PSLSD	1993	(SALDRU),	GHS	2005	(Statistics	South	Africa);	Own	Calculations
Table 12 shows the Gini coefficients (calculated using our basic needs index) for the provinces 
in South Africa. These show that most provinces experienced a decline in non-income 
inequality between 1993 and 2005. (The increases in the Gini coefficients for Gauteng and the 
Northern Cape are not statistically significant.)
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Table	12:	Gini	Coefficient	by	Province	for	Non-income	Inequality	by	Race	for	South	Africa,	1993-2005
By Province 1993 2005
Western Cape 0.11 0.09
Eastern Cape 0.29 0.27
Northern Cape 0.11 0.13
Free State 0.28 0.15
KwaZulu Natal 0.29 0.23








Six of the nine provinces, namely the Eastern Cape, Free State, KwaZulu-Natal, North West, 
Mpumalanga, and the Limpopo Province experienced statistically significant decreases in non-
income inequality over the period. (The decline in the Western Cape’s Gini coefficient is not 
statistically significant.)  These decreases range between two and thirteen percentage points, 
with the largest relative decline experienced by the Free State Province. Put differently, it 
appears as if the Free State benefited most from the increased service delivery by government 
over the period. 
Table 13: Theil Index by Province for Non-income Inequality by Race for South Africa, 1993-2005
By Province 1993 2005
Within 0.07863 75.5% 0.05684 87.6%
Between 0.02553 24.5% 0.00802 12.4%
Over all 0.10417 0.06486
Source:	PSLSD	1993	(SALDRU),	GHS	2005	(Statistics	South	Africa);	Own	Calculations
The Theil index by province shows that within-group inequality has been the key driver of total 
non-income inequality over the period. In fact, non-income inequality within provinces has 
become more important over time, with the contribution of this component increasing from 76 
percent to almost 88 percent. Again, this suggests that while most provinces benefited from 
increased access to services and assets, significant backlogs still exit in all provinces. 
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Overall, then, the evidence presented in this section has shown that, in contrast to the shifts 
in income inequality, non-income inequality – as measured using our basic services index 
– has decreased at the aggregate, for African households, in most provinces and for both 
male and female headed households. However, significant backlogs still exist. This highlights 
the opportunity for government to further impact on the levels of non-income inequality by 
targeting the delivery of basic services to those households that still do not have access to 
basic housing, water, electricity and sanitation. 
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  3.   The Relationship between Economic Growth, Poverty and    
 Inequality: 1995 – 2005 
There is very little debate, if any, amongst economists around the notion that a high level 
of economic growth is essential for poverty reduction. Indeed, increased growth rates, 
effectively measured by rising per capita incomes, would appear to make this link clear and 
simple:  if you increase economic growth, poverty levels will fall in the society. However, a 
more detailed assessment of experiences around the world, indicate that there are two very 
important caveats to this generalised view that ‘growth is good for the poor’. Firstly, the impact 
of economic growth on poverty differs significantly across countries. Hence, research from 
the World Bank, indicates that a two percent increase in growth rates will result in a reduction 
in poverty ranging from one to seven percent, depending on the country (Ravallion 2001). 
Secondly, as incomes grow, there is a high likelihood that this will also affect the distribution of 
that income. Put differently, economic growth often brings with it, some change in the levels of 
income inequality. When this occurs and if the result is an increase in inequality, the gains from 
growth to the poor may in fact be reduced. Higher inequality levels from growth ‘stretch’ the 
distribution of income and in so doing dilute the impact of economic growth on poverty. Given 
these two caveats to the growth-poverty nexus then, the critical insight is that economic growth 
may be necessary, but it is certainly not a sufficient condition for poverty reduction in a society. 
Section 2.1 showed that nominal per capita income at the aggregate level, and in fact for all 
race groups, increased between 1995 and 2005. When the impact of inflation is taken into 
account, the results are mixed. African and Asians did not experience any change in their 
real per capita household income. At the aggregate level, however, real per capita household 
income did increase, while the White and Coloured population experienced significant 
increases in their real incomes over the period. 
The evidence presented in Section 2.2 shows that over the same period, all South Africans 
experienced rising income inequality. The objective of this section is therefore to examine the 
relationship between economic growth, inequality and poverty between 1995 and 2005 and 
particularly the impact of the increasing income inequality on poverty levels. 
We first examine how the growth in incomes of the poor has fared relative to those of the rich 
between 1995 and 2005. As a starting point for the analysis, we examine growth incidence 
curves (GIC) for this period according to a set of covariates. Methodologically, we draw on 
the work of Ravallion (2001) and Ravallion and Chen (2003), who developed these concepts. 
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Essentially, the GIC approach allows us to determine whether growth in per capita household 
income in this period has been pro-poor in nature by plotting the growth in income across each 
centile of the distribution.  
Pro-poor growth may be defined in two broad ways, one definition being stronger than the 
other. Growth may be considered pro-poor in an absolute sense if the change in income 
levels of the poor (as defined by a chosen poverty line) over a given time period is larger than 
zero, that is, the income levels of the poor have increased in absolute terms. Graphically, this 
definition is represented by a growth incidence curve that is located entirely above zero along 
the whole distribution. Alternatively, growth may be considered pro-poor in a relative sense if 
the change in the income levels of the poor is larger than the change in the income levels of 
the non-poor (Bhorat & Van der Westhuizen 2007).
The GIC in Figure 10 shows that South Africa experienced absolute pro-poor growth between 
1995 and 2005. It is, however, also clear that the growth in per capita income was not pro-poor 
in the relative sense. While the GIC may be above zero and thus meets the weaker criterion of 
pro-poor growth, it is upward sloping and confirms the results from the previous section which 
showed that inequality has increased significantly over the period, with the rich experiencing 
faster growth in their per capita incomes than the poor. 
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  weight multiplied by the household size.
 2. Figures are annualised growth rates
In fact, for most of the distribution, from approximately the 15th to the 75th percentile, we see 
a relatively low but stable growth rate of around four percent. Those at the very bottom of the 
distribution experienced the smallest increases in per capita income, with the average annual 
growth rate ranging between two and four percent. The growth rate increases quite sharply 
from the 80th percentile, and at the upper end of the distribution the average annual growth 
rate exceeds the mean of the growth rates of 4.8 percent. The average annual growth in mean 
per capita income was just above seven percent over the period. 
Figure 11 presents the GIC for the African population between 1995 and 2005. Again, it is 
very clear that growth in per capita income was pro-poor in the absolute sense as all Africans 
experienced an increase in per capita income over the period. 
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 2. Figures are annualised growth rates
The growth experience for the African population mirrors that of South Africa at the aggregate 
level, with growth not being pro-poor in the relative sense. Those below the 15th percentile, 
that is, the ultra-poor, experienced the lowest growth rates, while individuals between the 
15th and 75th percentiles experienced growth rates below the mean of the growth rate of 
4.6 per cent. Those at the top end of the income distribution, that is, from the 80th percentile 
upwards, experienced the highest growth rates. In fact, those at the very top of the distribution 
experienced average annual growth rates of more than eight percent – almost double the 
mean of the percentile growth rates. 
The GIC’s for the Coloured and White population (found in Appendix 10) confirm that, 
irrespective of race, all South Africans experienced absolute per capita income growth 
between 1995 and 2005. However, it is also clear that again, irrespective of race, those at the 
top end of the distribution experienced higher growth rates in their incomes than the poor and 
growth was not pro-poor in the relative sense. 
The growth rates in the mean and median per capita income as well as the mean percentile 
growth rates at national level and for all four race groups are presented in Table 14. The rate 
of pro-poor growth for the poorest 10, 15, 20, 25 and 30 percent of the distribution are also 
presented.  
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Table 14:  Measures of Pro-poor Growth, 1995-2005
Total African Coloured Asian White
Growth rate in mean       7.29 5.94 9.37 6.86 9.8
Growth rate at median       3.78 4.14 6.09 5.29 8.19
Mean percentile growth rate 4.76 4.58 7.06 4.84 8.41
Rate of pro-poor growth at corresponding percentile
10 3.1 3.14 2.92 -3.94 3.21
15 3.47 3.56 3.58 -2.54 3.99
20 3.66 3.8 4.04 -1.82 4.63
25 3.77 3.94 4.37 -1.26 5.13
30 3.82 4.02 4.61 -0.74 5.5
Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
Notes: 1. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the     
  population in 2005 has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the     
  population has been weighted by the household weight multiplied by the household size.
 2. Figures are annualised growth rates
The evidence presented in Table 14 confirm that at the national level, and for the African, 
Coloured and White population, the rate of pro-poor growth increases as one moves from the 
10th to the 30th percentile. However, none of the individuals in the bottom 30 percent of the 
distribution experienced growth in per capita income higher than the mean growth rate. The 
White population generally experienced higher growth rates in per capita income than other 
race groups, with the African population exhibiting the lowest growth rates when compared to 
their White and Coloured counterparts. 
Asians at the bottom of the income distribution experienced negative growth rates over the 
period. The very small sample size, however, makes it difficult to interpret these results in a 
meaningful manner.
Figure 12 and Figure 13 present the GICs for urban and rural areas. These show that although 
absolute pro-poor growth occurred in both rural and urban areas, there was no relative 
pro-poor growth since those at the top of the distribution experienced higher growth rates than 
those at the bottom of the distribution. 
 
Income and Non-Income Inequality in Post-Apartheid South Africa: What are the Drivers and Possible Policy Interventions?
              34 
































0 20 40 60 80 100
Poorest p% ranked by per capita income
Growth Incidence Curve Growth rate in mean
Mean of growth rates
Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
Notes: 1. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the     
  population in 2005 has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the     
  population has been weighted by the household weight multiplied by the household size.
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The GIC for urban areas is upward sloping which confirms the inequality results in the previous 
section, that is, that income inequality in urban areas has increased as a result of relatively 
higher growth experienced by those at the top of the distribution. In addition, we find that the 
growth rates in urban areas only surpassed the mean of growth rates (of four percent) after 
the 70th percentile. While the growth rate is relatively stable from approximately the fifth to the 
65th percentile, it increases quite rapidly from the 70th percentile onwards. At the very top of 
the distribution, the average annual growth rate of ten percent is more than double the mean of 
the percentile growth rates.
Rural and urban areas followed different growth paths over the period. At the upper ends of 
the distribution, the growth rates are significantly higher in the urban areas. In the previous 
section, we saw that wage inequality is the main driver of total income inequality. Specifically, 
we saw that the wage premium paid to highly skilled workers is one of the main contributing 
factors to wage inequality. The result presented here may reflect the fact that highly skilled and 
highly paid workers generally reside in urban areas.
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 2. Figures are annualised growth rates
Another important difference between the two GICs is the range of the growth rates. For 
individuals living in urban areas, the average annual growth rates in per capita incomes range 
between less than zero to more than ten percent, while the growth rates for rural areas vary 
between just more than two and less than five percent. This relatively narrow range of growth 
rates also explains why income inequality for individuals living in rural areas did not change 
significantly over the period. 
Rural residents in the bottom half of the income distribution generally benefited more from 
economic growth than those in the top 50 percent, with the exception of those at the very 
top and the very bottom. This trend may be a reflection of how the provision of social grants 
benefited the poor in rural areas, with only those at the very top of the distribution benefiting 
from higher wages. 
Figure 14 presents the GICs for male- and female-headed households respectively. Again, it 
is clear that growth was pro-poor in the absolute sense for all individuals between 1995 and 
2005, irrespective of the gender of the head of the household that they resided in. 
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  population in 2005 has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the     
  population has been weighted by the household weight multiplied by the household size.
 2. Figures are annualised growth rates
Both GICs display a trend similar to that of the GIC for South Africa, with individuals at the 
bottom of the distribution experiencing lower average annual growth rates than those at the 
upper end of the distribution. In addition, the average annual growth rate for the majority of 
individuals falls below the mean of the growth rates (6.0 percent for individuals living in male-
headed households and 4.8 percent for those living in female-headed households – not shown 
on the graph). 
We also find that at the bottom of the distribution, individuals living in female-headed 
households fared slightly better than individuals living in male-headed households. However, 
individuals in the middle of the distribution living in a household headed by a male experienced 
higher growth rates in per capita income than those in female-headed households. This result 
may reflect the fact that women remain over-represented in low-skilled, low-paying jobs and 
that, especially in the low and semi-skilled occupations, women continue to earn less than 
their male counterparts. Living in male-headed as opposed to female-headed households did 
not impact differently on the growth in per capita income for individuals at the top end of the 
distribution. This may reflect that, in contrast to unskilled and semi-skilled occupations, women 
occupying highly skilled positions have been experiencing a decline in the gender wage gap. 
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The pro-poor growth measures for individuals living in male-headed and female-headed 
households are presented in Appendix 11. These show that while male-headed households 
experienced higher mean average annual growth rates than female-headed households, 
female-headed households enjoyed higher average annual growth rates at the 10th, 15th, 20th 
and 25th percentiles than both at the aggregate level and for male-headed households. 
To summarise then, while all individuals experienced absolute pro-poor growth in South Africa 
between 1995 and 2005, those at the top end of the distribution experienced higher growth 
rates than those at the bottom. This result holds true across race, location and gender of the 
household head and confirms a growth trajectory marked by a decrease in poverty levels, but 
sharply rising income inequality. 
The Impact of Growth and Inequality on Poverty
While the GICs and the pro-poor growth rates do take us some way beyond the static 
comparison of poverty shifts over a time period, one of the important value-added questions 
is to try and gauge the influence of both economic growth and changing inequality levels on 
reported poverty changes. We attempt below different approaches in trying to empirically detail 
this relationship, concentrating firstly on the growth-poverty elasticity and the influence of 
inequality shifts on this measure, and secondly on the Datt-Ravallion decomposition.
It is possible, by drawing on the work of Kakwani et al (1993), to compute the impact of 
economic growth on poverty levels. In addition though, it is argued that the process of 
economic growth may induce shifts in inequality which, in of themselves, may erode some or 
all of the growth-associated poverty reduction gains. In attempting to deal more broadly with 
the different interactions between poverty, inequality and growth, we follow the methodology 
proposed by Kakwani et al (1993), which essentially provides for three useful measures 
reflecting on the link between poverty, inequality and growth. The first of these is a distribution-
neutral measure of the poverty-growth elasticity. The measure is readily estimated using the 
following equation when utilising the Pα class of poverty measures:  
    










⎥ forα ≠ 0
   (1)
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Essentially, this equation measures the ‘pure growth’ effect on poverty reduction, independent 
of the distribution of income. However, in a period of economic growth, the income distribution 
changes can and often do occur. Hence, as noted above, it is entirely possible that despite 
economic growth, subsequent changes in the distribution of income may militate against 
any significant reduction in poverty. We can measure this relationship between poverty and 
inequality (as measured by the Gini), when utilising the Pα class of poverty measures (Kakwani 
et al 1993) as:






    (2)
Given the simultaneous impact of mean income growth and inequality on poverty, an important 
issue then is what increase in mean income is required to mitigate against distributional 
outcomes eroding poverty reduction gains. We can measure this for the FGT class of poverty 
measures, again according to Kakwani et al (1993) as: 




ηPα      (3) 
where the MPRS refers to the marginal proportional rate of substitution between mean income 
and income inequality.
Table 15 estimates the above relationships for 1995 and 2005, utilising both the R322 poverty 
line, and the R174 line. We first examine the poverty-mean income elasticities. In 1995, 
using the R322 a month poverty line, a one percent increase in (individual) mean per capita 
household income would reduce the poverty gap by just 1.22 percent. By 2005, this elasticity 
has declined slightly to just above one percent, meaning that a one percent increase in mean 
per capita income would lead to a slightly smaller reduction in the poverty gap. In other 
words, growth (as measured by the increase in mean per capita income) became slightly 
less pro-poor over the decade. The same trend is observed at the R174 poverty line, with the 
additional result that growth in income has a relatively larger impact on the poor at that level. 
At both poverty lines, the impact of increased income on the squared poverty gap also became 
marginally smaller over the period. 
These elasticity estimates, however, assume a constant Lorenz Curve, and hence do not take 
account of the distributional effects of the growth process. The crucial caveat to the above 
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growth-poverty nexus therefore, lies in the distributional changes that may occur in the growth 
process. Hence, if inequality increases during a growth phase, then there is a possibility that 
poverty levels may in fact increase even if per capita income did increase over the same 
period – a fact that we will turn to in greater detail below. The second set of measures, namely 
the poverty-inequality elasticity estimates, provides an indication of this sensitivity.
Table 15 Elasticities of Poverty Measures for South Africa. 1995 and 2005 
Category R322	poverty	line R174	poverty	line
Year 1995 2005 1995 2005
P1-growth elasticity -1.22 -1.06 -1.91 -1.62
P2-growth elasticity -1.50 -1.30 -2.24 -1.78
Gini-P1 elasticity 5.87 6.29 15.32 15.63
Gini-P2 elasticity 9.69 10.47 22.85 23.14
MPRS P1 4.82 5.91 8.00 9.68
MPRS P2 6.45 8.04 10.19 13.01
Source:  Statistics South Africa (1995 & 2005) and Own Calculations
Notes: 1. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the     
  population in 2005 has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the population has   
  been weighted by the household weight multiplied by the household size.
	 2.		 The	‘Poor’	category	refers	to	poverty	measures	based	on	a	poverty	line	of	R322	per	capita	per	month	in	2000		 	
	 	 prices,	while	the	‘Ultra-Poor’	category	is	based	on	a	poverty	line	of	R174	per	capita	per	month.
The poverty gap-Gini elasticity indicates that in 1995, on the R322 poverty line, a one percent 
increase in the Gini coefficient would increase the poverty gap by 5.9 percent, while it 
would increase the squared poverty gap by almost ten percent. These elasticities increased 
marginally in 2005, suggesting that the impact of inequality on poverty has increased over 
the decade. In both years, the elasticities are even larger when the R174 poverty line is 
considered. By 2005, a one percent increase in the Gini coefficient would increase the squared 
poverty gap by just over 23 percent. 
The final measure, the MPRS, provides some sort of policy benchmark in that it indicates 
the levels of economic growth that may maximise poverty reduction gains in the environment 
of growing inequality. In other words, it tells us the growth in mean per capita income that 
is needed to compensate for a one percent increase in inequality as measured by the Gini 
coefficient. 
In 1995, the MPRS with respect to the poverty gap indicated that per capita income would 
have to increase by 4.8 percent to compensate for a one percent in increase in the Gini 
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coefficient. By 2005, this measure increased to almost six percent. The figures indicate that the 
MPRS increased between 1995 and 2005 for both the poverty gap and the squared poverty 
gap. In all cases the MPRS is higher for the squared poverty gap than for the poverty gap, 
implying that the measure increases when the poverty aversion parameter α, increases. In 
addition, the MPRS is higher for the lower poverty line, suggesting that a greater economic 
growth response is required when trying to compensate for the distributional outcomes 
experienced by the ultra poor.
Our next set of estimates, the Datt-Ravallion decompositions (Datt & Ravallion 1992), 
complement the Kakwani estimates very well and deepens our understanding of the relative 
contributions of economic growth and distributional shifts to measured poverty outcomes. 
Very briefly, the Datt-Ravallion methodology revolves around decomposing the change in 
measured poverty into a growth and redistribution component. The growth component refers 
to the change in poverty that occurs, if we assume that inequality does not change. The 
redistribution component is the change in poverty, if mean income levels had not altered (that 
is, no growth has taken place). Finally, a residual variable captures the interaction between 
the growth and redistribution effects on poverty. If we take the equation P(z/u,Π), where z is 
the poverty line, u the mean income level and Π the Lorenz Curve, then the decomposition 
proceeds as follows:
   Pt+1 – Pt = G(t,t+1;r) + D(t,t+1;r) + R(t,t+1;r)
Where t and t+1 are the two time periods under discussion, P the poverty measure in the two 
time periods, G(.) represents the growth component, D(.) the redistribution and R(.) the residual 
components of the decomposition. We can define the growth and redistribution components in 
turn by the following:
   G(t,t+1;r) ≡ P(z/ut+1, Πr) - P(z/ut, Πr)
   D(t,t+1;r) ≡ P(z/ur, Πt+1) - P(z/ur, Πt)
Where r makes explicit the reference date with respect to the decomposition of the poverty 
shift (Datt & Ravallion 1992). In essence then, the above measure enables one to examine 
and discretely measure the relative contributions of changing inequality versus changing 
income growth to overall poverty changes. 
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Table 16 presents the results of the Datt-Ravallion decompositions for South Africa between 
1995 and 2005 at the aggregate level, by race, by gender of household head and according to 
two standard poverty lines (R322 and R174 a month in 2000 prices). The growth component 
refers to the growth in per capita income and the total change in poverty refers to the change 
in the headcount rate as measured by per capita income.
The result from the Datt-Ravalllion decompositions show that poverty levels (as measured 
by per capita income) increased at the aggregate level as well as for all race groups, and 
irrespective of the gender of the head of the household. The key result here is that the 
increasing levels of income poverty for all South Africans have been the result of the changing 
distribution of income (that is, increasing inequality) eroding any poverty gains realised from 
the growth in nominal per capita income over the period.
Table 16:  Datt-Ravallion Decompositions by Race and Gender of Household Head, 1995-2005
Category Growth component Redistribution component Total change in poverty
Poverty Line R322 per month
Total -21.24 28.65 7.42
African -19.90 27.41 7.51
Coloured -30.03 31.40 1.36
Asian -9.70 21.24 11.54
White -2.80 4.16 1.36
Male-Headed -23.41 25.49 2.08
Female-Headed -23.17 31.37 8.20
Poverty Line R174 per month
Total -20.62 26.87 6.26
African -20.65 27.23 6.58
Coloured -18.55 21.58 3.04
Asian -5.35 11.01 5.66
White -0.78 1.91 1.12
Male-Headed 19.40 21.89 2.50
Female-Headed -26.85 33.64 6.79
Source:  Statistics South Africa (1995 & 2005) and Own Calculations
Notes: 1. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the population in 2005    
  has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the population has been weighted    
  by the household weight multiplied by the household size.
	 2.		 The	poverty	shifts	are	based	on	the	headcount	measures	and	the	two	poverty	lines	of	R322	and	R174	respectively.
	 3.	 Residual	values	were	zero	in	all	cases
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For example, at the aggregate and when using the R322 poverty line, the increase in per 
capita income (as illustrated by the growth component) accounted for a decline of more 
than 21 percentage points in the income poverty headcount rate between 1995 and 2005. 
Over the same period, the redistribution component accounted for an increase of almost 29 
percentage points in the headcount rate. The overall result was an increase of more than 
seven percentage points in the national headcount rate. In other words, the relatively larger 
contribution of the redistribution component has meant that poverty increased over the period 
despite increasing levels of per capita income. 
The results of the decompositions also show that the redistribution component outweighed the 
growth component at both the R322 and R174 poverty lines and for all individuals, irrespective 
of race or the gender of the household head. 
The results of the Datt-Ravallion decompositions by province are shown in Appendix 
9. With the exception of the Free State at both lines and the Eastern Cape at the R174 
line, all provinces experienced an increase in their levels of income poverty as a result of 
the contribution of the redistribution component outweighing the contribution of the growth 
component. Put differently, in most provinces, individuals experienced an increase in their 
income poverty as a result of the increasing levels of inequality eroding the poverty gains 
associated with higher per capita incomes. For example, Kwazulu-Natal experienced an 
increase in its headcount rate of more than 17 percentage points at the R322 line. While the 
growth component contributed to a decline of almost 15 percentage points in the headcount 
rate, we saw earlier that the province Gini coefficient increased from 0.61 to 0.71 over the 
same period. This rising inequality contributed a massive 32.5 percentage points to the 
province’s headcount rate, completely eroding the contribution of the growth component. 
The evidence presented above confirms that growth has been inherently unequal in 
the period between 1995 and 2005, caused by the changing distribution of income. The 
process of growth and its nature has undermined the gains from economic growth in terms of 
poverty reduction. The nature of the growth trajectory is based upon, amongst other things: 
the exclusion of the second economy and the dominance of the first economy; the high 
concentration levels of the first economy and the high barriers to entry and the capital intensive 
nature of the production system in combination with the demand for highly skilled workers. 
Those involved in the second economy are unable to benefit from the opportunities presented 
by economic growth and are therefore trapped at the bottom of the end of the distribution. 
Furthermore, economic activity is concentrated in the formal market, which has high barriers 
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to entry preventing the bottom of the distribution from partaking in it. Barriers to entry include 
restricted access to the credit market – the poor do not have collateral to secure loans so that 
they are able to participate in the formal market. The poor are generally poorly uneducated and 
have low skills – characteristics preventing the mass of the population from entering the formal 
economy and benefitting from economic growth. 
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  4. Policy Interventions to Mitigate the Impact of Rising Inequality in   
 South Africa 
The evidence presented in previous sections has shown that wage inequality is undoubtedly 
the leading cause of income inequality. Not only is wage income the greatest source 
of income, but the distribution of it is highly skewed, with labour market participants being 
rewarded for the type (or level) of skill owned. While little can be done in the short-term 
to dampen the effect of wage inequality on income inequality, government can redistribute 
income via other means such as the provision of social grant income to poor households. 
 4.1 The Impact of the Increased Provision of Social Grants
One of the policies that government has implemented quite successfully is the provision of 
social grants. These grants are generally well targeted and mostly reach the poorest of the 
poor. Grants are targeted at the most vulnerable members of society, specifically the disabled, 
the aged and children.  Grant income has been found to make a substantial contribution to 
total income, and is often used to support an entire household. 
Pauw and Mncube (2007) provide a detailed analysis of the increase in government spending 
on social assistance and show that not only has the share of social grant expenditure in 
GDP increased significantly, but the number of social grant recipients has also increased 
significantly between 1996 to 2006. Government transfers grew from 2.5 percent of GDP 
in 1996/97 to just over three percent in 2005/06. The total number of grant beneficiaries 
increased from approximately three million in 1997 to 9.4 million in 2005. This translates into 
an average annual growth rate of 15.3 percent. 
The provision of grants accelerated after 2000. Grant expenditure increased from R20 553 
million in 2001/02 to R51 927 million in 2005/06, which represents a 26.1 percent growth in 
social assistance expenditure by the government. The number of grant beneficiaries increased 
significantly over this relatively short period, from 3.61 million to 9.40 million. While all grants 
experienced a significant increase in the number of beneficiaries between 2001 and 2005, 
the number of Child Support Grant recipients increased from 975 000 in 2001 to 5.6 million 
in 2005. This surge was due to both the increased public awareness of the grants and the 
extension of the grant to children up to the age of 14 years (Pauw & Mncube 2007). A key 
aspect of the post-apartheid fiscal expenditure patterns has therefore been a widening and 
deepening of South Africa’s social security system.
DPRU WP 09/138                        Haroon Bhorat, Carlene van der Westhuizen & Toughedah Jacobs
               45 
Figure 15 illustrates the changes in access rates to the state grants by income deciles 
between 1995 and 2005 in South Africa. The access rate is the percentage of households in 
each income decile which received grant income in these two years. 
Figure 15 Access rates of State Transfers South Africa, 1995 - 2005
Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
Notes: 1. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the     
  population in 2005 has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the     
  population has been weighted by the household weight multiplied by the household size.
There has been a significant increase in the access rates across the deciles between 1995 
and 2005. For example, the share of households in the first decile with access to grant income 
increased from 43.4 percent in 1995 to 64.5 percent in 2005. However, access to grant income 
not only increased significantly at the bottom deciles, but also in the deciles in the middle of 
the income distribution. For example, in the 6th decile the share of households with access to 
grant income increased from 19 percent to more than 50 percent. This is an important result, 
as it shows that grant income not only supports the very poor, but also a large portion of 
households in the middle of the distribution. In fact, between 50 and 75 percent of households 
in the bottom six deciles of the distribution received grant income in 2005. 
Figure 16 shows per capita grant income as a proportion of total per capita household income 
for South Africa between 1995 and 2005. This confirms that not only has grant income been an 
important source of income for the poor, but that the share of grant income in total household 
income has increased significantly over the period. 
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Figure 16:  Per capita grant income as proportion of total household income, South Africa, 1995 and 2005
Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
Notes: 1. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the     
  population in 2005 has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the     
  population has been weighted by the household weight multiplied by the household size.
In 1995 the share of grant income in total per capital income was relatively low. This reflects 
the relatively limited number of South Africans who were grant recipients during that time. 
Even in the bottom decile, grant income only contributed about 35 percent to total income in 
1995. The number of grant beneficiaries and therefore the contribution of grant income to total 
income increased significantly between 1995 and 2005. Furthermore, we observe that grant 
income has become an important contributing source to total income in all the lower income 
deciles. Even at the fifth income decile, we observe that grant income accounted for almost 
40 percent of total income in 2005. As discussed earlier, we see that even in the eighth decile, 
grant income accounted for almost ten percent of total income, a result driven by the fact that 
even individuals in this income decile had such low levels of income in the absence of grants 
that they qualified to receive a social grant (see Appendix 1 for the mean income across 
deciles). 
Social Grants as a Suppressor of Income Inequality
It is very clear from Figure 16 that grant income is an important source of income, even for 
those in the middle of the income distribution. The Gini decomposition in the earlier section 
was not able to adequately capture the significance of grant income for decreasing income 
inequality specifically due to the fact that grant income contributes significantly to total 
income up to the sixth decile. We have however observed that grant income had contributed 
significantly to total per capita income in particularly in 2005, and therefore deemed it 
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necessary to investigate what the levels of income inequality would have been in the absence 
of the provision of grants.
In order to estimate what the levels of inequality in South Africa would have been in the 
absence of the provision of social grants by government, we estimate the Gini coefficient, the 
Lorenz Curve and the Growth Incidence Curve for South Africa and by population group, using 
total per capita household income excluding grant income. 
Table 17 shows that grant income played a crucial role in mitigating the impact of income 
inequality over the period. 
Table	17:	Gini	Coefficients	for	Total	Per	Capita	Income	with	and	without	Grant	Income	by	Race,	



















African 0.56 0.59 0.03 0.61 0.71 0.10
Coloured 0.49 0.52 0.03 0.59 0.64 0.04
Asian 0.46 0.47 0.01 0.56 0.57 0.01
White 0.44 0.44 0.00 0.51 0.52 0.01
Overall 0.64 0.66 0.02 0.72 0.77 0.05
Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
Notes:	 1.	 The	changes	in	the	values	of	the	Gini	coefficients	between	1995	and	2005	are	“in	bold”	when	the	results	are		 	
	 	 statistically		 significant	at	the	95	percent	level.
 2. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the population in 2005 has been   
  weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the population has been weighted by the household   
  weight multiplied by the household size.
The results are striking: the Gini coefficient increases significantly (irrespective of the year or 
race group) when grant income is excluded. The social security system in South Africa has 
thus contributed significantly to lowering the overall levels of inequality in the country. 
At the aggregate the Gini coefficient increases from 0.72 to 0.77 in 2005 when grant 
income is excluded from total income, showing that grant income reduced income inequality 
considerably in 2005. The evidence also suggests that grant income played a greater role in 
the mitigation of income inequality in 2005 than in 1995. This result is not surprising, given the 
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large increase in both the number of beneficiaries and the expenditure on social grants over 
the period. 
The results from Table 17, however, contrast with earlier findings (see Table 7), which did not 
capture the role of state grants as far as its contribution to income inequality is concerned. 
The results from the Gini decomposition did not reflect this critical contribution of social grants 
to the reduction of income inequality. The difference in the results can to a large extent be 
explained by the differences in the methodology used when calculating the various measures. 
As far as the decomposition is concerned, we find that grant income is distribution neutral, that 
is, grant income has no effect on income inequality, since a large number of grant beneficiaries 
can be found in the middle of the distribution. This was clearly illustrated by Figure 15, which 
showed that even in the Sixth income decile, a large share of individuals received grant 
income in 2005. In the absence of grant income, the individuals would have had levels of 
per capita household income, which would have located them in the lowest income deciles. 
The provision of grant income increased the mean income of these individuals and therefore 
moved them into higher income deciles. 
The Gini decomposition method does not recognise this improvement in mean per capita 
income, but by estimating the Gini coefficient first including and then excluding grant income 
from total per capita income, we are able to capture the significance of grant income. Grant 
income has a stabilising effect on total income, and reduced income inequality significantly in 
both years. This result holds true for aggregate income inequality and for income inequality for 
the African population. For example, in 2005, income inequality amongst the African population 
would have been 0.71 in the absence of the provision of social grants. When grant income is 
included, the Gini coefficient declines significantly to 0.61.
The Lorenz Curve in Figure 17 confirms the results of the Gini coefficient, and graphically 
illustrates the relatively higher levels of income inequality in the absence of the provision of 
social grants. 
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0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Cum Proportion of Households
Total Y 1995 Total Y 2005 Y without grants 1995
Y without grants 2005 equality
Income
 Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and own calculations
Notes:	 1.	 The	changes	in	the	values	of	the	Gini	coefficients	between	1995	and	2005	are	statistically	significant	at	the	
	 	 95	percent	level.	
 2. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the     
  population in 2005 has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the     
  population has been weighted by the household weight multiplied by the household size.
The Lorenz Curves for both years show the impact of the provision of social grants, with both 
curves for income without grants lying further away from the “equality line” than the curves 
for income including grants. In addition, the relatively larger gap between the two curves 
for 2005 captures the relatively larger impact the provision of social grants had in 2005. For 
example, the curves illustrate that in 2005 when grant income is excluded from total income, 
the “bottom” 80 percent of individuals would have received only about 20 percent of total 
income. When grant income is included, the “bottom” 80 percent of individuals received more 
than 30 percent of total income.
The results for the Gini coefficient with and without grant income as a source of income for 
the nine provinces and by gender of household head are presented in Appendix 12. The 
results show that grant income made a significant difference to income inequality regardless of 
location and the gender of household head. Grant income played an especially important role 
in the mitigation of income inequality in the Eastern Cape, where the Gini coefficient increases 
from 0.69 to 0.80 in 2005 when grant income is excluded from total income. The provision 
of grants also had a relatively larger impact on inequality for individuals living in households 
headed by females. Specifically, the Gini coefficient declines from 0.80 to 0.68 when grant 
income is included as a source of income for individuals living in a household headed by 
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a female, while the Gini coefficient for individuals living in male-headed households only 
decreases from 0.73 to 0.70 when grant income is excluded. 
In the next section we compare two GICs, with grant income included and excluded 
respectively. We are therefore able to observe the impact of the provision of social grants 
on the growth rates at different percentiles of the income distribution. The results are quite 
startling, as the average annual growth rates for those at the bottom of the income distributing 
becomes negative in the absence of social grants. In fact, the percentile growth rates are 
negative up to about the 40th percentile of the distribution. In other words, in the absence of 
the provision of grant income growth would not have been pro-poor even in the absolute sense 
over the period. 
The mean percentile growth rate is also significantly lower at 1.7 per cent when grant income 
is excluded, compared to 4.8 per cent when grants are included as a source of income.
Figure 18:  Growth Incidence Curve Total per capita income excluding Grants South Africa, 1995-2005
Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
Notes: 1. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the     
  population in 2005 has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the     
  population has been weighted by the household weight multiplied by the household size.
 2. Figures are annualised growth rates
Again, those at the top end of the distribution benefit most from economic growth as captured 
by the upward sloping GIC when grant income is excluded. In fact, from the 80th percentile 
upward, the exclusion of grant income does not appear to substantially alter the growth rates. 
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Figure 19 presents the GICs for the African population and the pattern is similar to that at 
national level. The GIC for Africans calculated for total income without grant income, shows 
that without grant income, individuals at the bottom end of the distribution would have 
experienced negative growth in income over the period. The average annual growth rate only 
becomes positive for those individuals from the 50th percentile, and then increases steadily, 
showing that once more most of the growth in income would have occurred at the very top of 
the distribution. Again, in the absence of the provision of grant income, growth would not have 
been pro-poor in the absolute or relative sense. In addition, the mean of the growth rates (not 
shown here) is very close to zero. 
Figure 19:  Growth Incidence Curve for Africans – Household Income without Grants, 1995 - 2005
Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
Notes: 1. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the     
  population in 2005 has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the     
  population has been weighted by the household weight multiplied by the household size.
 2. Figures are annualised growth rates
The graph in Appendix 14 further illustrates the importance of social grants as a source of 
income for the African population. In 2005, grant income accounted for more than 50 percent 
of total income for individuals in the bottom four income deciles and even up to the seventh 
decile grant income was a significant source of income for this population group.
Excluding grant income from total income does not affect all the races equally (the GIC for the 
other race groups are presented in Appendix 13). While no pro-poor growth occurs when grant 
income is excluded from total income, the impact is less adverse for the Coloured population 
group. Only a small share of individuals at the bottom distribution displays a negative growth 
rate. The mean growth rate for the Coloured population is higher than the mean growth rate 
for the African population when grant income is excluded from total income. In addition, the 
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average annual growth rate becomes positive from around the 15th percentile for the Coloured 
population, compared to the 50th percentile for the African population. 
Grant income also plays a particularly important role for individuals living in rural households. 
The GIC in Figure 20 shows that in the absence of grant income, individuals up to the 70th 
percentile would have experienced a decline in their incomes between 1995 and 2005.
Figure 20 Growth Incidence Curves for Rural Households - Household Income without Grants, 1995-2005
 
Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
Notes: 1. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the     
  population in 2005 has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the population    
  has been weighted by the household weight multiplied by the household size.
 2. Figures are annualised growth rates
The results above suggest that government’s provision of social grants has been an extremely 
important source of income support to poor households in rural areas. Table 18 compares the 
pro-poor growth rate both when grant income is excluded and included for South Africa and for 
rural areas. These numbers reinforce the fact that in the absence of grant income, individuals 
at the bottom of the distribution would have experienced a decline in income over the period. 
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Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
Notes: 1. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the     
  population in 2005 has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the     
  population has been weighted by the household weight multiplied by the household size.
 2. Figures are annualised growth rates
The results also confirm the critical role of the provision of social grants in rural areas. The 
growth rates at the aggregate and for rural areas are quite similar when total income, including 
grants, is considered. In the absence of social grants, the rural poor would have experienced 
much more severe negative growth rates than the country as a whole. This result reflects 
the significance of social grants in the government’s fight against poverty and inequality in 
rural areas, which generally have higher unemployment rates and more limited employment 
opportunities than urban areas.
Below we attempt to attribute a value to the consumer loss experienced by individuals when 
grant income is excluded from total income, by estimating the area between the two GICs (GIC 
including and excluding grant income). We do this for the aggregate level, as well as for the 
African population and for individuals living in rural areas. 
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Since the functional form of the GIC is unknown, we use the definite integral method  to 
estimate the area below both curves. This involves: 
                  where  
€ 
f (uk )   is the minimum value of   
€ 
f  on  
€ 
[xk−1,xk ]  
 Once the areas below both curves are known, we subtract the two values from each other in 
order to estimate the area between the two curves. This would enable us to estimate the value 
of the income loss experienced by individuals in units. Despite the fact that the value capturing 
the income loss is not immediately comprehensible, the values can be compared with one 
another, and thus provide us with some clues about the stratum of the population which is 
most affected by grant income. 





Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
Notes: 1. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the     
  population in 2005 has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the     
  population has been weighted by the household weight multiplied by the household size.
 The evidence presented in table 19 reinforces the importance of grant income to individuals 
across South Africa. Without grant income, the income area loss would range from 411.2 units 
in South Africa as a whole to 767.2 units in rural areas. Grant income therefore makes the 
biggest difference to those individuals residing in rural areas, followed by African individuals. 
The income loss area for those in rural areas is almost double that of South Africa as a whole. 
The value of the area of income lost is not an intuitive one, to remedy this, we consider the 
rand value of income lost if grant income was excluded as a source of income. The rand value 
is calculated by subtracting the difference in total income between 1995 and 2005 by the 
difference in total income excluding grant income between 1995 and 2005.
€ 
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 Potential Income Loss 
   =
   =     
€ 
1≤ / ≤100    
 where 
€ 









is the total income 




is the income from state transfers and  i is each percentile. 
Table 20 presents the result at the aggregate as well as for the African population and 
individuals living in rural areas. These suggest that if grant income was excluded from total 
income, the potential loss in income experienced at the aggregate level would have been more 
than R43 billion. The African population would have experienced a loss of almost R35 billion, 
while those living in rural areas would have experienced a loss of about R22 billion. Table 20 
also provides an indication of the share of this potential loss of income in GDP, total fiscal 
expenditure and total grant expenditure. 
 Table 20 Potential Loss of Income if Grant Income is Excluded from Total Income





% of Revised GDP % of Total Fiscal Expenditure % of Total Grant Expenditure
African 2.26 8.01 67.15
Rural 1.41 4.99 41.82
Aggregate 2.80 9.94 83.32
Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008); National Treasury and Own Calculations
Notes: 1. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the     
  population in 2005 has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the population has   
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The importance of grant income, especially for individuals residing in rural areas, raises many 
questions around the policy options available in the fight against the impact of rising inequality. 
The rate at which grants are rolled out is unsustainable, and it would be imprudent for the state 
to increase the number of grant beneficiaries at the same rate as in the past. The state should 
consider implementing complimentary policy measures to the roll out of grant income, such as 
strengthening labour market policies and the education system. This would make it easier for 
labour market entrants to secure employment which would make it easier to wean the South 
African society off the social security system that we so desperately depend on. 
DPRU WP 09/138                        Haroon Bhorat, Carlene van der Westhuizen & Toughedah Jacobs
               57 
 5. Conclusion 
The results from the paper confirm the perception that South Africa is one the most unequal 
societies in the world. The shifts in income inequality were dramatic to say the least. Income 
inequality increased significantly between 1995 and 2005, irrespective of race, gender of 
household head and location. An unexpected result was that income inequality between 
race groups, rather than income inequality within race groups was the leading cause of the 
increasing levels of income inequality. The result was unexpected, since previous research 
using data from a shorter time period, suggested that it was income inequality within race 
groups (driven by higher levels of African inequality) that was causing the increase in income 
inequality. 
To find the reason behind the burgeoning income inequality, we decomposed the Gini 
coefficient by income sources. The evidence points to wage income as the main contributor to 
income inequality. Not only did wage income remain the driver of total income inequality, but 
its contribution to income inequality increased over the period. The increasing levels of wage 
inequality were mainly explained by the increasing wage differential between the 90th and 50th 
percentiles, rather than the wage differential between the top and bottom of the wage income 
distribution. The increasing gap in wages between the 90th and 50th percentiles can partly be 
explained the ever-increasing skill premium paid to highly skilled workers. 
Interestingly, though, the share of income inequality explained by income from self-
employment decreased in the period under review. In other words, while remaining positive, 
the contribution of income from self-employment to total income inequality decreased between 
1995 and 2005. While the suspicion remains that the increasing share of self employment 
income in the lower income deciles may largely be a reflection of improved capturing of this 
type of income by the 2005 survey, this result does highlight the potential of the promotion of 
self-employment as intervention aimed at alleviating income inequality. 
For a more holistic view of inequality we also considered changes in non-income inequality 
and an index of public and private assets was created to enable us to measure this. Even 
though income inequality increased significantly between 1995 and 2005, we find that there 
was an overall decrease in non-income inequality, irrespective of race, gender of household 
head and province. Whilst non-income inequality decreased, many households, especially at 
the bottom end of the distribution, remain without access to basic services such as running 
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water, sanitation and electricity, highlighting the important role government still has to play in 
the further provision of basic services.
The GIC for South Africa shows that economic growth in South Africa did not benefit the 
rich and poor equally. Even though growth in South Africa was pro-poor in the absolute 
sense, economic growth benefitted the top end of distribution more than the bottom of the 
distribution. The GIC for South Africa is upward-sloping which indicates that income inequality 
has increased, confirming the results of the measures of income inequality. The GIC for the 
African population, urban and rural areas, and male- and female-headed households exhibit a 
similar trend, with absolute pro-poor growth being present across sub-groups. The experience 
of individuals living in rural areas was somewhat different to that of individuals living in urban 
areas, as most of the individuals at the bottom of the rural income distribution experienced 
greater levels of economic growth than the rest of the distribution. 
We also find that most of the potential poverty gains of economic growth was eroded by the 
rising levels of income inequality within South Africa. In addition, economic growth became 
less pro-poor over time. Higher growth rates are therefore needed to compensate for the 
rising inequality. It is unlikely that South Africa would be able to sustain higher growth rates, 
and so alternative policies are needed which would aid poverty reduction. One such policy 
that the South African Government has successfully implemented is the increased provision 
of social grants. Not only did more individuals have access to grant income, but grant income 
also accounted for a greater proportion of total income over time. The increased provision 
of grant income has helped to suppress the increase in income inequality as shown by the 
large differences in the Gini coefficient and the GIC curve, when grant income is included and 
excluded as a source of income. This is especially true for individuals living in rural areas, as 
their heavy reliance on grant income explains why rural areas were better off than their urban 
counterparts when their GICs including grant income were compared. It was grant income 
that provided the poor with the means to have such a positive growth experience. Without 
grant income as a source of income, many households across the distribution would have 
experienced negative growth, and there would be no pro-poor growth, not even in its weakest 
form. The African population and individuals living in rural areas would be most affected 
in the absence of increase provision of state transfers. While appearing to be an effective 
policy too in at least limiting the increase of income inequality, large scale expansion of the 
social security net is not a viable policy option, highlighting the importance of other policy 
interventions particularly aimed at job creation for the poor and the unskilled. 
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 Appendix 1:  Annual Mean Per Capita Household Income by Income  
  Decile
Total Household Income Per Capita
1995 2005
Decile 1 710 967
Decile 2 1 212 1 818
Decile 3 1 688 2 527
Decile 4 2 262 3 340
Decile 5 3 014 4 419
Decile 6 4 131 5 992
Decile 7 5 830 8 826
Decile 8 8 942 14 136
Decile 9 15 598 28 579
Decile 10 46 124 110 111
Total 8 941 18 066
Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
 
 Appendix 2: Inequality Shifts by Province:  Gini Coefficients for 
  South Africa, 1995 and 2005
 1995 2005
Total 0.64 0.72
Western Cape 0.60 0.69
Eastern Cape 0.65 0.69
Northern Cape 0.64 0.66
Free State 0.64 0.69
Kwazulu-Natal 0.61 0.71




Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
Notes:	 1.	 The	changes	in	the	values	of	the	Gini	coefficients	between	1995	and	2005	are	statistically	significant	at	the	95		 	
	 	 percent	level,	with	the	exception	of	the	Free	State,	the	North	West	province,	and	Limpopo.	
 2. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the population in 2005 has been   
  weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the population has been weighted by the household   
  weight multiplied by the household size.
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   Appendix 3: Theil Index by Province for South Africa, 1995-2005
Province South Africa
 1995 2005
All (total) 0.87  1.14  
Within 0.77 88.4% 1.02 89.2%
Between 0.10 11.6% 0.12 10.8%




   Appendix 4: Theil Index Gender of Household Head South Africa, 
   1995 - 2005
Theil Index
Gender head of household South Africa
 1995 2005
All (total) 0.87  1.14  
Within 0.81 93.5% 1.05 92.4%
Between 0.06 6.5% 0.09 7.6%
Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
Note:		 We	are	unable	to	calculate	t-statistics	and	confidence	intervals	for	the	Theil	Index	and	therefore	unable	to	comment	on	the	statistical		
	 significance	of	the	changes	between	1995	and	2005	in	the	Theil	Index.	
  Appendix 5: Shifts in the Urban and Rural population South Africa,   
  1995-2005
 1995 2005 Average Annual Growth Rate
 Urban Area          20,007,096   27,951,500 3.4%
 Rural Area          18,213,800   19,438,972 0.7%
 Total          38,220,896   47,390,472 2.2%
Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
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   Appendix 6: The Composition of State Transfers and “Other” Income
State transfers in 1995 include: Old Age Pension; Disability grants and Family, other 
allowances, maintenance while other income include: Workmen’s Compensation, 
Unemployment; Income from sidelines; Income from sale of vehicles; Income from sale of 
property ; Income from sale of goods ; Payments from boarders;  Value of company housing; 
Value of company transport; Value of pension funds, etc ; Value of other company benefits 
; Value of lump sum payments from employer ; Value of endowment policies ; Workmen’s 
compensation payouts;  Life insurance payouts, inheritances ; Funeral fund claims ; Claims 
from property damage ; Claims from road accident funds; Income from other gratuities ; 
Stokvel claims ; Withdrawal from savings;  Income from bursaries ; Income from cash 
donations ; Value of food received ;Value of housing received; Value of clothing received; Value 
of other donations received; Lobola/dowry received ; All other income; All other income not 
elsewhere shown; Total income ; Tax refunds. 
In 2005 State transfers include Old Age Grants, Disability Grants and Child Support Grants 
while Other income include: Income received from Hobbies; Sidelines & part-time activities; 
Sale of vehicle, property etc; Payments from boarders & other non-members; Goods & 
services by virtue of occupation; Claims; Stokvel; Non-refundable bursaries; Benefits, 
donations and gifts; Cash; Value of food received; Value of housing; Value of clothing; Value 
of transport; Value of other benefits, donations, gifts etc; Lobola or dowry received; Income 
from gambling; Tax refunds received;  Income not elsewhere specified; Gratuities and other 
lump-sum payments.
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   Appendix 7: Gini Decomposition by Income Source for Race groups,   





























































































Income Source Rk Gk Sk SkGkRk Share
Employment 0.90 0.70 0.64 0.40 71.8%
Self-employment 0.77 0.98 0.08 0.06 10.6%
Grants -0.08 0.82 0.06 0.00 -0.7%
Capital 0.69 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.5%
Private pensions 0.37 0.98 0.01 0.00 0.8%
Other 0.60 0.76 0.21 0.10 17.1%






























































































Income Source Rk Gk Sk SkGkRk Share
Employment 0.94 0.79 0.68 0.51 83.1%
Self-employment 0.70 0.95 0.08 0.05 8.8%
Grants 0.00 0.63 0.13 0.00 0.0%
Capital 0.72 1.00 0.01 0.00 0.7%
Private pensions 0.54 0.98 0.01 0.01 1.0%
Other 0.53 0.84 0.09 0.04 6.4%
Gini    0.61 100.0%
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Income Source Rk Gk Sk SkGkRk Share
Employment 0.91 0.57 0.74 0.38 78.4%
Self-employment 0.84 0.98 0.06 0.05 9.8%
Grants -0.11 0.82 0.06 -0.01 -1.1%
Capital 0.64 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.3%
Private pensions 0.46 0.98 0.02 0.01 1.8%
Other 0.54 0.81 0.12 0.05 10.7%






























































































Income Source Rk Gk Sk SkGkRk Share
Employment 0.95 0.67 0.79 0.50 84.5%
Self-employment 0.64 0.97 0.04 0.02 4.2%
Grants -0.10 0.74 0.06 0.00 -0.8%
Capital 0.86 1.00 0.01 0.01 1.3%
Private pensions 0.58 0.98 0.02 0.01 1.5%
Other 0.75 0.85 0.09 0.06 9.4%
Gini 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.59 100.0%
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Income Source Rk Gk Sk SkGkRk Share
Employment 0.64 0.53 0.55 0.19 42.3%
Self-employment 0.79 0.93 0.22 0.16 36.5%
Grants -0.31 0.96 0.01 0.00 -0.6%
Capital 0.50 0.97 0.02 0.01 2.4%
Private pensions 0.17 0.92 0.06 0.01 2.1%
Other 0.68 0.82 0.14 0.08 17.4%




























































































Income Source Rk Gk Sk SkGkRk Share
Employment 0.85 0.61 0.70 0.36 70.7%
Self-employment 0.64 0.92 0.13 0.08 15.6%
Grants 0.13 0.95 0.02 0.00 0.4%
Capital 0.65 0.97 0.02 0.01 2.4%
Private pensions 0.05 0.90 0.05 0.00 0.4%
Other 0.68 0.88 0.09 0.05 10.6%
Gini    0.51 100.0%
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Income Source Rk Gk Sk SkGkRk Share
Employment 0.71 0.51 0.59 0.21 46.1%
Self-employment 0.77 0.91 0.23 0.16 34.1%
Grants -0.38 0.88 0.02 -0.01 -1.3%
Capital 0.51 0.98 0.01 0.01 1.2%
Private pensions 0.48 0.98 0.01 0.01 1.5%
Other 0.72 0.84 0.14 0.08 18.3%






























































































Income Source Rk Gk Sk SkGkRk Share
Employment 0.91 0.63 0.74 0.43 76.2%
Self-employment 0.75 0.94 0.16 0.11 19.8%
Grants -0.34 0.80 0.03 -0.01 -1.6%
Capital 0.51 0.99 0.01 0.00 0.7%
Private pensions 0.52 0.98 0.01 0.01 1.3%
Other 0.51 0.88 0.04 0.02 3.5%
Gini 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 100.0%
Sources: Statistics South Africa 1995 and 2008; Own Calculations.
Notes:	 Population	weights	are	not	available	for	the	2005	dataset.	The	population	has	been	weighted	by	the	household	weight	multiplied	by			
 the household size to obtain the population weights. Both sets of weights are 2001 Census weights. 
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   Appendix 8: Poverty Shifts by Race, Province and Gender of 
   Household Head
Category Headcount Poverty gap ratio
Year 1995 2005 1995 2005
R322 per person  per month
African 51.40% 58.91% 23.57% 28.86%
Coloured 28.90% 30.26% 9.94% 11.93%
Asian 3.51% 15.05% 0.76% 6.19%
White 0.52% 1.87% 0.15% 1.08%
Western Cape 21.19% 25.51% 6.88% 10.01%
Eastern Cape 63.86% 64.46% 32.14% 31.28%
Northern Cape 46.23% 56.45% 19.27% 26.26%
Free State 55.79% 45.70% 25.96% 20.06%
Kwazulu-Natal 42.72% 60.34% 17.95% 31.83%
North West 51.99% 50.49% 24.53% 25.21%
Gauteng 12.89% 28.43% 4.23% 12.56%
Mpumalanga 51.93% 56.60% 22.85% 27.23%
Limpopo 54.40% 68.85% 26.06% 33.77%
Male 35.41% 37.49% 15.16% 17.22%
Female 58.08% 66.28% 27.89% 33.33%
Total  42.58% 49.99% 19.18% 24.22%
R174 per person per month
African 26.91% 33.49% 9.32% 12.79%
Coloured 8.96% 12.00% 2.35% 4.45%
Asian 0.27% 5.93% 0.02% 2.98%
White 0.08% 1.21% 0.06% 0.58%
Western Cape 5.92% 10.18% 1.60% 3.65%
Eastern Cape 38.53% 36.57% 14.14% 13.52%
Northern Cape 21.44% 29.60% 6.43% 10.81%
Free State 29.91% 20.70% 9.38% 7.59%
Kwazulu-Natal 19.22% 38.58% 6.24% 15.57%
North West 28.79% 29.99% 9.92% 11.50%
Gauteng 3.64% 13.21% 1.05% 5.27%
Mpumalanga 25.04% 30.64% 8.26% 11.69%
Limpopo 30.74% 39.57% 11.35% 14.33%
Male 16.60% 19.09% 5.40% 7.31%
Female 32.59% 39.38% 11.82% 15.05%
Total 21.65% 27.91% 7.43% 10.67%
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   Appendix 9: Datt-Ravallion Decompositions by Province
Category Growth component Redistribution component Total change in poverty
Poverty Line R322 per month
Western Cape -25.76 30.09 4.33
Eastern Cape -23.52 24.22 0.59
Northern Cape -16.60 26.81 10.21
Free State -35.03 24.94 -10.09
Kwazulu-Natal -14.90 32.52 17.62
North West -25.93 24.43 -1.50
Gauteng -12.78 28.33 15.55
Mpumalanga -27.70 32.37 4.67
Limpopo -9.94 24.39 14.45
Poverty Line R174 per month
Western Cape -15.99 20.25 4.26
Eastern Cape -31.23 29.27 -1.96
Northern Cape -17.35 25.50 8.15
Free State -33.47 24.25 -9.21
Kwazulu-Natal -14.05 33.41 19.36
North West -25.60 26.81 1.20
Gauteng -8.87 18.44 9.57
Mpumalanga -26.21 31.81 5.60
Limpopo -12.23 21.06 8.84
Source:  Statistics South Africa (1995 & 2005) and Own Calculations
Notes: 1. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the population in 2005    
  has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the population has been weighted    
  by the household weight multiplied by the household size.
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Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2005) and Own Calculations
Notes: 1. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the     
  population in 2005 has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the population has   
  been weighted by the household weight multiplied by the household size.
 2. Figures are annualised growth rates
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   Appendix 11: Measures of Pro-poor Growth by Gender of Household   
     Head, 1995 – 2005  
Total Male-Headed Female-Headed
Growth	rate	in	mean							 7.29 8.44 7.45
Growth	rate	at	median							 3.78 5.67 4
Mean percentile growth rate 4.76 6.16 4.9
Rate of pro-poor growth at corresponding percentile
10 3.1 3.27 3.85
15 3.47 3.83 4.19
20 3.66 4.16 4.37
25 3.77 4.38 4.46
30 3.82 4.54 4.51
Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
Notes: 1. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the     
  population in 2005 has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the     
  population has been weighted by the household weight multiplied by the household size.
 2. Figures are annualised growth rates
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   Appendix 12: Gini Coefficient Including and Excluding Grant Income   
        from Total Income by Province and Gender of Household   
     Head, 1995-2005
Per capita Income Per capita Income 
without Grants
Per capita Income Per capita Income 
without Grants
Province 1995 1995 2005 2005
Western Cape 0.6 0.62 0.69 0.72
Eastern Cape 0.65 0.73 0.69 0.80
Northern Cape 0.64 0.69 0.66 0.75
Free State 0.64 0.68 0.69 0.75
Kwazulu-Natal 0.61 0.65 0.71 0.79
North West 0.65 0.68 0.68 0.74
Gauteng 0.56 0.57 0.68 0.70
Mpumalanga 0.6 0.63 0.69 0.77
Limpopo 0.63 0.69 0.63 0.77
Gender of Household Head
Male 0.63 0.66 0.70 0.73
Female 0.59 0.66 0.68 0.80
Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and own calculations
Notes:	 1.										 The	changes	in	the	Gini	coefficient	are	statistically	significant	when	the	results	are	in	“bold”	
 2. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the population in 2005 has been   
  weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the population has been weighted by the household weight   
  multiplied by the household size. 
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   Appendix 13: GIC excluding Grant Income by Race group, 1995 - 2005




























0 20 40 60 80 100
poorest p% ranked by per capita income
Growth incidence curve Growth rate in mean
Mean of growth rates



























0 20 40 60 80 100
poorest p% ranked by per capita income
Growth incidence curve Growth rate in mean
Mean of growth rates
DPRU WP 09/138                        Haroon Bhorat, Carlene van der Westhuizen & Toughedah Jacobs
               75 




























0 20 40 60 80 100
poorest p% ranked by per capita income
Growth incidence curve Growth rate in mean
Mean of growth rates
 Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2005) and Own Calculations
Notes: 1. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the     
  population in 2005 has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the population    
  has been weighted by the household weight multiplied by the household size.
 2. Figures are annualised growth rates
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   Appendix 14: Per capita Grant Income as a Proportion of Total    
     Household Income for the African Population, 1995- 2005
Source: Statistics South Africa (1995 and 2008) and Own Calculations
Notes: 1. The population in 1995 has been weighted according to the 1996 Census, while the     
  population in 2005 has been weighted according to the 2001 Census. In both datasets, the population has   
  been weighted by the household weight multiplied by the household size.
